A Note on Labor Contracts With Private Information and Household Production

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Staff Report 131

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Ed Nosal
Richard Rogerson
Randall Wright - Consultant

Published January 1, 1991

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Abstract
A classic result in the theory of implicit contract models with asymmetric information is that “underemployment” results if and only if leisure is an inferior good. We introduce household production into the standard implicit contract model and show that we can have underemployment at the same time that leisure is a normal good.

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Browse Research by Topic

Staff Report 131

A Note on Labor Contracts With Private Information and Household Production

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