The RegionStaff Report 254
Dynamic Games With Hidden Actions and Hidden States
Narayana R. Kocherlakota - Consultant
Harold L. Cole
September 1998
Abstract
We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player’s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player’s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state.
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