Automation and the Future of Work.

Pascual Restrepo Based on joint work with Daron Acemoglu.


- $1. \ \mbox{Conceptual framework: Tasks, automation, and displacement.}$
- 2. Empirical evidence: Industrial robots and the automation of manufacturing.
- 3. New tasks and reinstatement.
- 4. The future of work.


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Tasks and Technology

- Production requires tasks, produced by machines (productivity γ) or labor.
- Over time, more tasks automated.





Automation and the displacement effect

If tasks are combined via a Cobb-Douglas aggregator

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Y = A \cdot L^{\alpha} K^{1-\alpha},
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Allocation of tasks linked to factor shares and productivity

 $\alpha = {\sf Labor} \ {\sf share} = {\sf Share} \ {\sf of} \ {\sf tasks} \ {\sf performed} \ {\sf by} \ {\sf labor}$

> Automation has an ambiguous effect on labor demand:

Wages
$$= \alpha \times \frac{\gamma}{L}$$
.

• $\alpha \downarrow$ displacement effect and $Y/L \uparrow$ productivity effect.

Concerns about Single-minded Focus on Automation

- ► The displacement effect:
 - Automation could reduce employment and/or wages.
 - ► Suppose the labor share goes down from 65% to 45%, One needs output to expand by 44% (=65/45-1) to sustain employment and wages.
 - Automation reduces the labor share and decouples W from Y/L.
 - > Distributional consequences: capital income becomes more relevant.
- ► By itself, automation brings limited productivity gains:
 - Productivity gains depend on $\gamma \cdot W/R$.
 - Alone, automation runs out of steam.
 - Worst case for productivity and labor: replacement by mediocre robots and machines!

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
Empirical evidence: Industrial robots

- Automatic and multipurpose machines with several axis suitable for industry.
- Robots perform tasks that used to be labor intensive (machining, welding, assembling, inspecting, packaging).
- Large increase between 1993 and 2014: in the US, fivefold increase from 2 to 10 robots per thousand industry workers.



Industries exposure to robots

- Data on stock of robots from the International Federation of Robotics for the 1993-2007 period.
- Measure of *exposure to robots* based on adoption of robots among European industries.
- Adoption highly correlated across industries, which suggest it is driven by technology.



Exposure to robots

Exposure to robots and the labor share




Figure: Change in the labor share and exposure to robots. Data from the BEA.

Exposure to robots and output





Figure: Change in the log of quantities produced and exposure to robots. Data from the BEA.

A broader transformation of manufacturing

- Broader transformation of manufacturing starting in the late 80s.
- Labor share of the sector declined from 65% to 45% in 20 years.
- Consistent with an increased emphasis in industrial automation.





Estimating the impact of exposure to robots on US

- Adjustment of local-labor markets.
- Exposure to robots between 1993-2007 for commuting zones, c:

$$\sum_{i} \frac{\text{Baseline}}{\text{Employment share}_{ci}} \times \frac{\text{Robot}}{\text{Exposure}_{i}}$$

What happened to exposed labor markets during the 1990-2007 period?






Exposed labor markets

- One robot per thousand workers:
 - Epop falls by 0.4pp
 - ► Wages fall by 0.7%
 - No evidence of migration or expansion of services.
 - People drop out of labor force
- Aggregate estimates: 300-600K jobs and 0.25-0.5% decline in wages.


Estimates for employment



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New tasks and the reinstatement effect

- Technology is not just about automation and displacement.
- > Over time, we have also created new tasks and improve existing machinery.
- ▶ These technologies *reinstate* labor and interact with automation.



New job titles and employment





Figure: Employment growth (annualized) against the share of new job titles in each occupation. Data from Jeffrey Lin (2011).

New job titles and employment

- Even if the economy keeps creating new tasks, the adjustment may be difficult:
 - New jobs take time to appear.
 - New jobs require different skills.
 - New jobs are in other regions.

Share of workers doing new jobs.



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Looking ahead

Future of labor depends on technologies invented and adopted:

- Automation is an ongoing process, but we have found ways to counteract it in the past through technologies that reinstate labor.
- Concerns:
 - Single-minded focus on automation.
 - Possibility that new tasks and ideas about products and services that can generate a demand for labor are in turn getting harder to find.
- If concerns materialize, we are left with automation, but not the successful combination of new tasks and automation that spurred growth in productivity and labor demand in the past.