

## **Why Has the US Economy Recovered So Consistently from Every Recession in the Past 70 Years?**

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**System Working Paper 20-02**  
**May 2020**

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This paper was originally published as *Working Paper 2020-20* by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. This paper may be revised. The most current version is available at <https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2020-20>.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO

WORKING PAPER SERIES

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<https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2020/20/>

### **Suggested citation:**

Hall, Robert E., Marianna Kudlyak. 2020. “Why Has the US Economy Recovered So Consistently from Every Recession in the Past 70 Years?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2020-20. <https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2020-20>

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# Why Has the US Economy Recovered So Consistently from Every Recession in the Past 70 Years? \*

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May 20, 2020

## Abstract

It is a remarkable fact about the historical US business cycle that, after unemployment reached its peak in a recession, and a recovery began, the annual reduction in the unemployment rate was stable at around 0.55 percentage points per year. The economy seems to have had an irresistible force toward restoring full employment. There was high variation in monetary and fiscal policy, and in productivity and labor-force growth, but little variation in the rate of decline of unemployment. We explore models of the labor market's self-recovery that imply gradual working off of unemployment following a recession shock. These models explain why the recovery of market-wide unemployment is so much slower than the rate at which individual unemployed workers find new jobs. The reasons include the fact that the path that individual job-losers follow back to stable employment often includes several brief interim jobs, sometimes separated by time out of the labor force. We show that the evolution of the labor market involves more than the direct effect of persistent unemployment of job-losers from the recession shock—unemployment during the recovery is elevated for people who did not lose jobs during the recession.

JEL: E32, J63, J64.

Keywords: Business cycle, Recovery, Unemployment, Recession

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\*Hall's research was supported by the Hoover Institution. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System. Nothing in this paper should be construed as a recommendation for the NBER's dating turning points in the US economy or the function of the Congressional Budget Office in measuring potential GDP.

We study data from the labor market during recoveries from past recessions. We find that the recovery phase of the US business cycle has been slow but irresistible. As we write, the United States and the world are in the throes of a major pandemic and resulting deep recession. We believe that an investigation of historical recoveries may have a bearing on understanding the recovery from the current recession.

Following Romer and Romer (2019), we start from the premise that the business cycle involves variations in aggregate slack, and that the best measure of slack is the unemployment rate. We note that a well-documented property of the unemployment rate—most recently confirmed by Dupraz, Nakamura and Steinsson (2019)—is that unemployment rises rapidly in response to a significant aggregate adverse shock and then gradually recovers to a level of 3 to 5 percent of the labor force. Like fuel prices, unemployment rises like a rock and falls like a feather. As we write, unemployment has been rocketing upward.

Our thesis is that the economy has a powerful tendency to recover from serious adverse shocks, but recovery takes time. We show that other potential driving forces do not appear to generate deviations from the downward path of unemployment during recoveries. These forces include monetary and fiscal initiatives and variations in productivity and labor-force growth.

Our results suggest a rather different view of cyclical fluctuations from most current thinking. In our view, a variety of serious shocks can trigger a recession. The differences and similarities between the current pandemic shock and its immediate predecessor, the financial crisis of 2008-9, are illustrative. Millions of workers lose jobs they have held for some time and where they have accumulated job-specific human capital. In the following recovery, rebuilding gradually and inevitably occurs. Until the recovery is complete, employment is depressed because the recovery process involves higher unemployment. This unemployment is effectively a reduction in labor supply. In contrast, the dominant current view emphasizes slow recoveries in labor demand and treats the elevated unemployment as the result of a shortfall of demand relative to supply in the labor market.

We believe our findings are relevant for the recovery that is expected to follow the deep recession triggered by the pandemic, but we do not try to predict how the recovery will evolve. In particular our work should not be interpreted as a forecast that unemployment will decline as slowly in the coming recovery as it has in past recoveries. Our work is complementary to Gregory, Menzio and Wiczer (2020) in this respect.

We also emphasize a parallel role for the adverse effect of shocks on relations between employers and suppliers of credit. Lending standards spike along with unemployment when a recession strikes and breaks up some previously durable relations. Relations between firms and workers gradually rebuild. There is an interaction between events in the credit market

and in the labor market—higher lending standards reduce incentives to hire workers and drive unemployment upward.

Our view of the labor market has points in common with Pries (2004) and can be seen as responding to the challenge of Cole and Rogerson (1999) to explain how aggregate unemployment recovers much more slowly than does an individual spell of unemployment. Like these authors, we build models within the framework of the dominant modern view of unemployment, associated with Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides.

We focus on recoveries. Our analysis starts in an economy that has just been hit by an adverse shock that triggered a recession. It appears that these shocks have heterogeneous sources. The major recession that began in 1981 is generally viewed as the result of a sharp monetary contraction, while the major recession that began at the end of 2007 got much of its strength from the financial crisis of September 2008. And the current shock is the result of a global pandemic. This paper recognizes that the shocks that propel unemployment sharply upward are heterogeneous. Historical recoveries have been much more homogeneous. We have open minds about whether the forthcoming recovery will follow the historical pattern.

We proceed in the following steps:

First, we demonstrate that a steady decline in unemployment following a recession shock occurred reliably in the recoveries in the 70 years we include—years when unemployment has been measured reliably and consistently over time in the Current Population Survey. We point out two puzzles: the puzzle of *slow decline* of unemployment and the puzzle of *linear decline*. Cole and Rogerson (1999) called attention to the first puzzle—unemployment declines much more slowly than the measured exit rates from unemployment among individuals would seem to indicate. Linearity has received less attention. In most dynamic systems, the approach to the statistical equilibrium or ergodic point slows down as the system approaches that point. But unemployment continues to decline at about a half a percentage point per year right up to the time it reaches its minimal level of about 3.5 percent.

Second, we study the job loss that occurs when a crisis launches a recession. A spike in job loss is visible in a variety of data sources, measuring layoffs, job destruction, displacement, and unemployment insurance claims. But the spike in job loss in these measures is far smaller than the total increase in the number of unemployed workers.

Third, we ask whether the volume of job losers and their likely speed of finding long-term replacement jobs is enough to explain the long-lasting bulge of total unemployment that is only gradually worked off during even a long recovery like the one just ended. We conclude, from data on displaced workers collected every two years in the Current Population Survey, that the number of workers displaced even in the severe recession starting in 2007 was not

enough to explain the volume of excess unemployment present in the US economy during the period from 2009 through 2014. Something happened in the labor market during that period that caused elevated unemployment among workers who were not displaced around 2009.

Fourth, we examine the puzzles of low recovery speed and linear recovery paths in the framework of the DMP model. We calculate the effective exit rate from unemployment, which is lower than the exit rate for individuals from one month to the next. Those individual exits are frequently temporary departures from the labor force or short-term jobs, and are then followed by additional spells of unemployment, as described in Hall and Kudlyak (2019). In the DMP equilibrium, the unemployment rate falls more gradually, so it accounts for some of the puzzle of low recovery speed, but the path is quite convex and far from linear.

We build another model that explains slow but sure recoveries with a congestion externality. When unemployment spikes, employers' costs of recruiting rise. According to standard DMP principles, higher costs of filling vacancies discourage job creation and raises equilibrium unemployment. This model, without heterogeneity of job-finding rates, generates a generally slow decline of unemployment during a recovery, but suffers from the same convexity of the path and thus also fails to deal with the linearity puzzle.

We also develop a model of the disruption of credit supply that occurs in financial crises. The operation of markets for publicly traded securities is impeded during and after a crisis, but these markets tend to return to normal faster than does the labor market. We develop evidence that traditional bank lending based on continuing bilateral relations suffers disruptions that heal at the same low but steady speed as do similar relations in the labor market. The disruptions put a wedge between the cost of capital in open markets and the effective cost to credit intermediated through banks. The wedge is visible in tougher lending standards for an extended period following a crisis. The wedge erodes the incentive to create jobs and raises the unemployment rate through the principles of the DMP model. This model comes closer to matching the observed linear path of unemployment.

Fifth and finally, we show that recoveries have had a wide variety of accompanying movements of policy instruments and arguably exogenous aggregate driving forces. Unemployment declines smoothly despite irregular movements of possible driving forces, including fiscal and monetary policy, productivity growth, labor-force growth, and variations in stock-market discounts.

We conclude that the economy includes a strong internal force toward recovery that operates apart from policy instruments and apart from productivity growth and financial developments revealed in the stock market. We make the case that the internal force originates in the labor market. After a negative shock, employers gradually find it profitable to

hire more aggressively. Unemployment falls as the unemployed are put back to work. Rather than a pull from expansionary policy, the growth in employment arises from a push toward lower unemployment.

## 1 Recovery of Unemployment Following a Recession

In this section we show that the average rate at which unemployment recovers is similar across recoveries, regardless of the cause of the prior recessions. We also show that the path of convergence of unemployment to its minimal value of around 3.5 percent is linear as a recovery progresses, though models tend to predict that the decrements in unemployment decline over time, so the path is convex, not linear.

### 1.1 Measuring recoveries

To study recoveries, we need a measure of the business cycle. Romer and Romer (2019) discuss cycle measures in detail. They conclude that the preferred defining characteristic of the measure is its ability to capture slack or unused resources. In current business-cycle research, the primary alternative definition is to extract a higher-frequency component from real GDP or other output measure. That component is the higher-frequency series from the Hodrick-Prescott filter or from a bandpass filter. We agree with the Romers that tying the business cycle to slack is conceptually superior to tying it to higher-frequency movements.

Movements of some cyclical variables, notably real GDP, contain components such as productivity growth that need to be filtered out. The concept of potential real GDP is aimed at accomplishing that filtering. The ratio of actual to potential real GDP filters out the movements of productivity, labor-force size, and other forces not usually associated with the business cycle. The Congressional Budget Office produces a widely used and respected measure of potential real GDP. Figure 1 shows the real GDP gap as the ratio of actual real GDP to potential, times 100.

Our view further adopts the Romers' conclusion that the unemployment rate or a measure derived from the unemployment data from the Current Population Survey is the best available measure of the cycle. It appears to contain almost no movements associated with productivity or similar forces that would call for filtering out. Fortunately, the movements of the CBO's measure and the unemployment measure are quite similar. Figure 2 compares the CBO's real GDP ratio to a measure based on the labor market, constructed as 100 minus the unemployment rate.

The magnitudes of cyclical fluctuations in the GDP ratio is greater than the magnitude for the unemployment-based measure, especially in the years before 1990. The chronology




Figure 1: The Ratio of Actual Real GDP to the CBO's Estimate of Potential Real GDP




Figure 2: Comparison of Cycle Measure Based on the GDP Ratio to a Measure Based on the Unemployment Rate






Figure 3: Average Annual Rates of Decline in Unemployment in Percentage Points, by Recovery, and Total Decline during Each Recovery

of peaks and troughs is similar for the two measures. We will use unemployment in what follows, but the use of the CBO’s GDP ratio measure would give much the same results.

## 1.2 Uniform unemployment recovery across recessions

Figure 3 depicts the change of the unemployment rate for individual recoveries, in percentage points. The blue bar shows the annual rate of decline in percentage points of unemployment and the red bar shows the total percentage-point decline during the recovery. The height of the blue bars was lower than earlier for the recoveries beginning in 1992 and 2003, but annual rate was second-highest of all recoveries in the recovery that just ended. And the total recovery from 2010 to 2020 was the greatest over the 70-year history. The uniformity of the annual rates of recovery in this figure is striking.

Why is there a widespread impression that the recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 was slower than previous recoveries? The answer is that recoveries tend to be judged in terms of output. Both actual growth of real GDP and growth of potential GDP were lower for a number of reasons, including especially the decline in the rate of productivity growth—see Fernald, Hall, Stock and Watson (2017). The facts are that output growth was substandard during the recovery but the decline in unemployment was robust.




Figure 4: The Paths of Unemployment During Recoveries

### 1.3 The linear path of convergence of unemployment as a recovery progresses

During a recovery, unemployment gradually declines to converge to a minimum unemployment rate, which we take to be 3.5 percent. This minimal rate is well under estimates of the natural unemployment rate or NAIRU. The view we develop in this paper does not involve the concept of a natural rate. Instead, we believe that unemployment gradually declines with equal decrements over the duration of a recovery, until it reaches the minimal rate of 3.5 percent. Only in the most favorable case of a long recovery is it possible for the rate to be that low. As the recovery progresses, unemployment declines along a straight line with constant slope.

Figure 4 shows the unemployment rate during the recoveries in our cycle chronology, with the recession spells left blank. Our two observations about recoveries are apparent in the data: unemployment declines smoothly but slowly throughout most recoveries most of the time, and unemployment declines along a straight line, not one that curves upward—it is not convex.

In many adjustment processes, a variable makes smaller and smaller steps toward its ultimate target—the path from above is convex. Here convergence occurs in roughly *equal* steps. The actual path is close to linear. This surprising finding is influential in our discussion of the potential mechanisms of recoveries. We consider a number of plausible explanations

of the slow pace of decline in the unemployment rate, but most of them imply convex rather than linear paths.

## **2 Recessions: Substantial but Short-Lived Spikes in Job Loss**

In this section we document the substantial but short-lived spikes of job loss in recessions. We do not include the huge volume of job loss that has just occurred from the pandemic, which is still mounting. We consider four measures of job loss:

- Layoffs, the flow of workers whose jobs ended at the initiative of employers
- Job destruction, the amount of employment decline among establishments with shrinking employment.
- Worker displacement, job loss among workers with at least three years of tenure at the lost job.
- Unemployment insurance claims

### **2.1 Layoffs**

#### **2.1.1 Layoffs in JOLTS**

Figure 5 shows data on layoffs from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. A layoff occurs when an employer terminates a worker without prejudice, typically because continuing employment has become unprofitable. Most layoffs occur without any definite promise to rehire, but explicitly temporary layoffs are an important minority of layoffs. On average, 20 million workers lose their jobs each year in normal times. A substantial but short-lived burst of above-normal layoffs occurred soon after the financial crisis in the fall of 2008.

#### **2.1.2 Mass layoffs**

Mass layoff occurs when a relatively large number of firm's employees lose jobs. Such events often involve high-tenured workers who tend to suffer prolonged periods of joblessness following job loss (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), Davis and von Wachter (2011)).

The Mass Layoffs Statistics program from the BLS tracks the effects of major job cutbacks using data from the states' unemployment insurance databases. A mass layoff is defined by the occurrence of fifty or more initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits being filed against an employer during a 5-week period. These employers are contacted by the




Figure 5: Layoffs Recorded in JOLTS, Monthly at Annual Rate, in Thousands of Workers

state agency to determine whether the separations last more than 30 days. Such events are termed extended mass layoffs. The BLS obtains information on the total number of workers separated during the extended mass layoffs, including the workers who do not file for unemployment insurance, and the reasons for these separations according to the employer. These layoffs involve both people subject to recall and those who are terminated. The program ran from 1995 to the first quarter of 2013.

Figure 6 shows the number of initial claimants due to the extended mass layoffs. The number hovers around a million in normal times but spikes during recessions. A decline in business demand and financial difficulties are the main reasons cited behind the spikes. In 2009, extended mass layoffs spiked to 2.4 million.

Another source of data on mass layoffs arises from the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), which requires employers to provide notice 60 days in advance of covered plant closings, covered mass layoffs, or sale of business that result in an employment loss. Employers are covered by WARN if they have 100 or more employees, not counting employees who have worked less than 6 months in the last 12 months and not counting employees who work an average of less than 20 hours a week. The term *employment loss* means (1) an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement; (2) a layoff exceeding 6 months; or (3) a reduction in an employee’s hours of work of more than 50 percent in each month of any 6-month period. A plant closing occurs if an employment site will be shut down, and the shutdown will result in an employment loss





Figure 6: Extended Mass Layoffs, in Thousands of Initial Claimants per Year

for 50 or more employees during any 30-day period. A mass layoff occurs without a plant closing if the layoff results in an employment loss at the employment site during any 30-day period for 500 or more employees, or for 50-499 employees if they make up at least 33 percent of the employer’s active workforce. Under certain circumstances, smaller employment losses also trigger notification requirements.


The WARN data over an extended period of time are publicly available for many states, but not all. Figure 7 shows the number of layoffs for Alabama, Michigan, and Washington, as examples. The data show clear spikes in layoffs in 2009. For Alabama and Washington the figure shows layoffs sorted by the effective date. For Michigan, we have information about the date of the WARN notice but not about the effective date of the layoff, so we sort the layoffs by the expected effective date, which is the notice date plus two months.

### 2.1.3 Permanent layoffs by duration


Figure 8 shows unemployment involving permanent job loss by duration, from the CPS. Layoffs with duration of 5 weeks or less is a flow of new layoffs. The flow spikes at the onset of recessions and declines only slowly afterwards.



(a) Alabama




(b) Michigan




(c) Washington

Figure 7: Mass Layoffs, by State



(a) All durations



(b) Less than 5 weeks

Figure 8: Unemployment due to Permanent Job Loss, by Duration




Figure 9: Job Destruction, in Thousands of Workers per Year

## 2.2 Job destruction

The Business Dynamics Statistics data report job destruction. This measure is defined as the sum of all establishment-level reductions in employment. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2013) proposed job destruction as a measure of separations and validated the definition through study of the microdata from JOLTS. Although an employer could accomplish a reduction in employment by cutting back hiring and relying on normal attrition, in fact, almost all employment reductions take the form of separations. When an adverse shock hits the economy, separations jump even though quits fall. Layoffs account for more than all of the observed reduction in employment. Figure 9 shows data from the BDS on job destruction. It shows a considerable bulge of job destruction immediately after the financial crisis.

## 2.3 Displaced workers

Displaced workers are defined as those 20 years old and over who have worked for their employers for 3 or more years at the time of displacement, who lost or left jobs because their plants or companies closed or moved, because there was insufficient work for them to do, or because their positions or shifts were abolished. These are job losses among workers with substantial tenure, in contrast to layoffs measured in JOLTS.

<i>Survey in January of</i>	<i>Displacement occurring in calendar years</i>			<i>Number of displaced workers</i>	<i>Unemployed at time of survey</i>
2002	1999	2000	2001	3,969	841
2004	2001	2002	2003	5,329	1,076
2006	2003	2004	2005	3,815	511
2008	2005	2006	2007	3,641	655
2010	2007	2008	2009	6,938	2,505
2012	2009	2010	2011	6,121	1,634
2014	2011	2012	2013	4,292	893
2016	2013	2014	2015	3,191	507
2018	2015	2016	2017	2,981	429

Table 1: Total Long-Tenured Displaced Workers and the Number of Unemployed at the Time of the Survey, in Thousands

Table 1 shows the findings of the displaced workers supplement to the CPS taken in January of even-numbered years from 2002 through 2018. The survey inquires about current unemployment and displacement in the year ended the month before, and one and two years earlier. As far as we know, this is the only panel-type data reaching this far back between current unemployment and earlier displacement, and contains enough respondents who are unemployed for reasonable analysis. Administrative data rarely report unemployment and panel surveys do not contain many workers who are unemployed.

The design of the displaced workers supplement to the CPS poses an interesting challenge to inference about the time path of long-term displacements and the path of unemployment following displacement. Figure 10 shows an initial attempt. The annual estimates satisfy the overlapping three-year sums and are informed by the timing of layoffs and job destruction within each three-year span. The figure also shows a counterfactual path of displacements, which eliminates the two recession spikes present in the actual data.

## 2.4 Initial unemployment insurance claims

Figure 11 shows the initial unemployment insurance claims. In contrast to layoffs (Figure 5) but similarly to unemployment, during recessions the initial UI claims go up like a rock and go down as a feather.

Why is there a discrepancy between the number of layoffs and the initial UI claims? One factor is that not all eligible unemployed claim the benefits. Building on Blank and Card






Figure 10: Estimated Annual Displacements, Actual and Counterfactual

(1991), Auray, Fuller and Lkhagvasuren (2019) find that from 1989 through 2012, the take-up rate averaged 77 percent. Research shows that the number of those who are eligible but do not claim benefits increases in recession and declines in recoveries (see Fuller, Ravikumar and Zhang (2012) and Auray et al. (2019)). Thus, fluctuations in take-up rates goes in the wrong direction as an explanation of the discrepancy between layoffs and the initial UI claims.

## 2.5 Comparison of measures of the spike of job loss in a recession

Figure 12 compares the estimated displacement counts to the tabulations of layoffs, job destruction, and extended mass layoffs. Although the normal level of displacement is far below the levels of layoffs or job destruction, the increase in displacements at the outset of the two recessions is an important fraction of the increases for layoffs and job destruction.

Figure 13 shows excess job loss associated with the 2009 recession by four measures of job loss, together with excess unemployment. All four job loss measures show a substantial but short-lived spike. Unemployment shows a substantial increase and slow return to its pre-recession level.




Figure 11: Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims, in Thousands




Figure 12: Annual Levels of Layoffs, Job Destruction, Displacements, and Extended Mass Layoffs, in Thousands




Figure 13: Excess Job Loss in 2009 and Excess Unemployment, in Thousands of Workers

### 3 The Direct Channel from Job Loss to Subsequent Lingering Unemployment

We consider the hypothesis that excess job loss directly accounts for the spike and the subsequent long slow decline of excess unemployment. We call it the *direct-channel* hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the extra individuals who become unemployed because of the recession shock follow a path similar to those found in research such as Jacobson et al. (1993) and Davis and von Wachter (2011) that tracks the post-displacement paths of workers who lose their jobs from layoffs. These paths often include multiple spells of unemployment.

#### 3.1 Information about the subsequent role in unemployment from job displacement

The CPS survey supplement measuring job displacement is the only one with the crucial information about lingering unemployment among job-losers in the years following job loss.

We fit a simple time-series regression with the biennial data for unemployment in January of even-numbered years of workers suffering displacements in the previous three years as the left-hand variable and three lagged values of the estimated displacement counts as right-hand variables, along with a constant. The relation takes the form

$$u_t = f_1(D_{t-1}) + f_2(D_{t-2}) + f_3(D_{t-3}) \quad (1)$$

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
$\alpha$	Intercept	-991	(144)
$\beta_1$	Effect of prior year's displacements	0.76	(0.07)
$\beta_2$	Effect of displacement 1 to 2 years ago	0.21	(0.08)
$\beta_3$	Effect of displacement 2 to 3 years ago	0.37	(0.06)
$R^2$	0.991		
$\sigma$	116		

Table 2: Regression Results for the Relation between Lagged Displacements and Current Unemployment of Workers Suffering those Displacements

We linearize as

$$u_t \doteq \alpha + \beta_1 D_{t-1} + \beta_2 D_{t-2} + \beta_3 D_{t-3} \quad (2)$$

If market tightness were constant over time,  $\beta_1$  would be the unemployment rate among workers who suffered displacement within the past year,  $\beta_2$  one to two years ago, and  $\beta_3$  two to three years ago. The design of the survey prevents learning about unemployment among people displaced more than 3 years ago. However, job-finding rates are lower in the same years that displacements are high, so  $f(D)$  is a convex function of  $D$ . This property implies that the intercept  $\alpha$  should be negative and the coefficients should be greater than the unemployment rates.

Table 2 shows the regression results. The good fit suggests that the imputation of annual timing for the displacements is reasonably successful. The fact that the 3rd-year coefficient is somewhat larger than the 2nd-year one is within sampling variation, but may also reflect the fact that a worker with displacement 3 years ago also suffered an earlier displacement as well. In addition, there may be a stronger convexity effect for the 3rd-year displacement. The negative intercept confirms the expectation of a convex relation between displacements and later unemployment.

Our first use of the regression is to impute unemployment of workers suffering displacements in the previous three years in January of the odd-numbered years when the supplement to the CPS was not performed. Figure 14 shows the fitted values from the regression for the years 2002 through 2018, in red, along with the actual unemployment counts for the even-numbered years when the supplement to the CPS occurs, in blue.

Our second use of the regression results is to calculate how much lower displacement-related unemployment would have been absent the spikes of displacement in the two recessions.




Figure 14: Actual and Fitted Unemployment Counts of Workers Suffering Displacements in the Previous Three Years, in Thousands

sions. Figure 15 shows the results of this counterfactual and compares displacement-related unemployment from the two recessions to overall unemployment in January in the years since 2001. The rise after the recession is material relative to the overall increase in unemployment following the recession that began in 2001, but is a small part of the large increase in unemployment following the financial crisis.

### 3.2 Application to other measures of job loss

We use the estimates from Table 2 to calculate excess unemployment from excess job loss by the four measures shown in Figure 13. Figure 16 shows the unemployment resulting from excess job loss in 2009 and total excess unemployment.

Figure 17 shows the contribution of unemployment from excess job loss in 2009 to the cumulative excess unemployment during the 2007-09 recession.

### 3.3 Excess unemployment of new entrants

By definition, new entrants to the labor force are not the victims of job loss events. A bulge of unemployment of new entrants following an adverse shock indicates that either (1) unemployment is infectious, or (2) the bulge of unemployment arises from a decline in the incentives to create jobs. Figure 18 shows that new-entrant unemployment nearly doubled




Figure 15: Total Unemployment and the Component Related to Bursts of Displacement Associated with Two Recessions, in Thousands




Figure 16: Unemployment from Excess Job Loss in 2009 and Total Excess Unemployment, by Four Measures of Job Loss, in Thousands of Workers




Figure 17: Contribution of Excess Job Loss to Cumulative Excess Unemployment, by Four Measures of Job Loss, in Thousands of Worker-Years

after the financial crisis. This finding rules out the hypothesis that the sole cause of lingering unemployment following the crisis was the slow absorption of workers who suffered job loss from the crisis. The direct channel cannot be the only link between a crisis and its subsequent gradual recovery.

### 3.4 Conclusions about the relation between the magnitude of the increase in unemployment following a recession shock and the measures of job loss

An unambiguous spike in regular and mass layoffs, job destruction, and displacement, and mass layoffs accompanies the shock that marks a recession. Figure 16 shows that the spike in layoffs more than fully accounts for the spike in unemployment in 2009 but cannot account for all of the excess unemployment afterwards. That is, the excess job loss accounts for the magnitude of the initial increase in unemployment, but not its persistence. The persistence is too large to be explained as reflecting only the personal experiences of the extra job-losers dating from the spike. The direct channel is only part of the story of persistent high unemployment after the crisis. This conclusion is reinforced by the rise in unemployment among new entrants to the labor force.




Figure 18: Number of Unemployed New Entrants to the Labor Force, in Thousands

## 4 Effective Exit Rate from Unemployment

### 4.1 Defining and measuring the effective exit rate

From the data on unemployment in the displaced workers supplement, we can estimate what we call the *effective exit rate from unemployment*, denoted  $f_t$ . We know the number of people in the survey who were displaced in the prior three years and who are currently unemployed. We also have our estimates of the number of people displaced in each of those years. The effective exit rate is based on the assumption that the probability of being unemployed  $\ell$  months following a displacement is the product of the monthly exit rates from the time of displacement up to the survey. Here we adopt the perspective originated in Krueger, Cramer and Cho (2014), and expanded in Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) and Hall and Kudlyak (2019), that the typical path from initial unemployment to current labor-market activity often involves a mixture of spells of short jobs, time out of the labor force, and unemployment. As Krueger and co-authors showed, the probability of being unemployed a year later conditional on starting unemployed is much higher than would be expected from the monthly probability of unemployment ending raised to the 12th power. Our calculation here extends the calculation by two additional years, as we exploit the 3-year look-back in the displaced workers supplement of the CPS.



The implied relation between the observed number of people unemployed in the January survey of month  $t$  is

$$U_t = \sum_{\ell} \prod_i (1 - f_{t-i}) N_{\ell}. \quad (3)$$

We parameterize as

$$f_{\tau} = a - b u_{\tau}. \quad (4)$$


The parameter  $b$  is the negative sensitivity of the effective exit rate to the standard national unemployment rate  $u$ . Not surprisingly, it turns out to be essentially 1. We estimate  $a$  and  $b$  by minimizing the sum of squared residuals of the actual values to the implied values of  $U_t$ . The estimated value is  $b = 1.00$  and the monthly effective exit rates range from 0.042 in 2010 to 0.099 in 2018. By contrast, the monthly exit rate is around 0.5.

## 4.2 Implications of low effective job-finding rates


This subsection provides evidence that recessions involve unemployment with long durations looking for work. During the long re-employment process, the unemployed often circle among unemployment, out of the labor force, and short-term jobs.

Figure 19 shows unemployment by reason as a share of the labor force, except for labor force new entrants. The figure shows that recession involves not only an increase in unemployment due to permanent and temporary layoffs but also due to completion of temporary jobs and labor force re-entry. This points towards an elevated number of individuals taking temporary jobs and circling between unemployment and OLF.


When a crisis causes a spike in unemployment, there is a shift away from stable jobs and toward brief jobs in the working-age population. This shift gradually subsides during the recovery. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we study the 8-month CPS activity paths, as in Hall and Kudlyak (2019). We define short employment spells as those lasting one or two months. These are the spells that are preceded and succeeded by unemployment or out of the labor force. We define an individual to have stable employment if employed in all 8 reported months. We calculate the average number of short employment spells among the CPS respondents of working age. We also calculate the average number of respondents in stable employment. We create an index of the shift toward short jobs as the difference between first and second of these calculations. Figure 20 shows the short-spell index starting in 1976 for four demographic groups. The indexes jump upward in recessions and gradually decline during the ensuing recovery for all four groups.




(a) Unemployment by reason




(b) Permanent job losers




(c) Completed temporary job



(d) Labor force re-entrants




(e) Temporary layoffs




(f) Quits


Figure 19: Unemployment by Reason, as Share of Labor Force




(a) Men aged 25-54



(b) Women aged 25-54



(c) Men aged 16-24



(d) Women aged 16-24

Figure 20: Indexes of the Duration of Employment Spells

## 5 Models and Evidence

This section describes a sequence of versions of a model that may help understanding of the mechanisms lying behind our findings about what happens after a crisis. These are the slow rate of recovery of unemployment as it continues to decline up to a decade after the spike, and the linearity of the path of convergence of unemployment to its minimal value as time passes.

We build on the DMP model of the labor market. Aspects of labor-market dynamics in recoveries that we consider in our investigation:

- Low rates of effective job finding despite high monthly exit rates out of unemployment
- A congestion effect arising from an external effect of unemployment on recruiting cost
- Credit frictions that decline during a recovery, raising workers' profitability to their employers

Our model treats levels of unemployment and employment as state variables. At the outset, these state variables have values left behind by an event we call the crisis. The model traces the movements of the state variables for the next decade or so, trying to emulate the slow but steady return of the variables to their normal values along a linear rather than convex path.

### 5.1 The basic DMP model

The simple DMP model has three components: (1) wage determination, (2) tightness determination, and (3) the law of motion of unemployment. We make the simplifying assumption that productivity and the wage are constant. This assumption is relatively innocuous and greatly simplifies the model.

The labor market operates on the principles of random search. We measure the tightness of the market by the duration,  $T$ , of the typical vacancy. We let  $P$  be the present value of a newly hired worker's productivity and  $W$  be the present value of the wage, and  $J = P - W$  be the net benefit to the firm from hiring a new worker. The flow cost of recruiting is a constant,  $\kappa$ . Recruiting satisfies the zero-profit condition,

$$\kappa T = J. \tag{5}$$

This condition pins down tightness:

$$T = \frac{J}{\kappa}. \tag{6}$$

A standard principle of the DMP model is that the job-finding rate increases with tightness:

$$f = \phi(T). \tag{7}$$

Our discussion of the model will follow the traditional principle that the only flow in the labor market that is sensitive to tightness is from unemployment to employment. To keep the exposition compact for now, we neglect variations in flows into and out of the labor market and from job to job without intervening unemployment. Thus the law of motion of unemployment is

$$\dot{u} = s \times (1 - u) - f u, \tag{8}$$

where  $s$  is the separation rate into unemployment. The job-finding rate  $f$  is also the exit rate from unemployment under the standard simplifying assumptions. The ergodic unemployment rate is  $u^* = s/(s + f)$ .

Figure 21 describes the behavior of the model in a phase diagram. The stationary value of unemployment is

$$u^* = \frac{s}{s + f} = \frac{s}{s + \phi\left(\frac{J}{\kappa}\right)}. \tag{9}$$

The movements of two variables,  $u$  and  $T$ , are along the horizontal line labeled  $J/\kappa$ . For example, the economy might start right after the crisis created high unemployment coupled with low tightness, at the right end of that line. As the recovery proceeds, the economy moves horizontally to the left. The dots on the horizontal path show the progress by month. In the first month, unemployment falls by more than two percentage points. As the unemployment rate falls during the recovery, the steps become smaller, but the calculations show that the economy closes most of the gap in just three or four months.

The curve in Figure 21 is the locus of stationary unemployment in the  $u, T$  space. At high unemployment rates, a given job-finding rate generates a higher outflow from unemployment simply because the rate applies to more workers. With lower unemployment, constancy of unemployment requires a higher jobfinding rate and thus a tighter labor market. The amount of the downward slope of the stationary locus is derived from an estimated matching function.

Figure 22 compares the path of unemployment starting from 10 percent implied by this model with the actual path starting from the peak in 2009. We use the standard job-finding rate of 0.3 per month together with a separation rate that yields an ergodic unemployment rate of 3.5 percent. The model's recovery is far speedier than actuality, the point made emphatically by Cole and Rogerson (1999). And the path is extremely convex, far away from the linear path of actual unemployment.




Figure 21: Phase Diagram for the Standard DMP Case




Figure 22: Recovery Path of Unemployment with the Standard DMP Model




Figure 23: Recovery Path of Unemployment with Estimated Effective Exit Rate from Unemployment, and Actual Unemployment, 2010 to 2020

## 5.2 Unemployment path with low effective unemployment exit rate

We know that the 30 percent per month transition rate from unemployment to employment in the basic DMP model considerably overstates the actual exit rate from unemployment. Figure 23 shows the model’s unemployment path in the most recent recovery, together with the actual path, with the lower effective exit rate from unemployment of 0.042 per month estimated in a previous section. This alteration substantially delays the recovery but not nearly enough to match the actual path of unemployment. Note also that the model’s path is quite convex—it has a constant rate of closing the gap, whereas the actual path is essentially linear and thus has a rising rate of closing the gap. A calculation based on an effective exit rate of 0.02 matches the actual path better, but retains noticeable convexity.

We conclude that using the estimated effective unemployment exit rate of 0.042 makes an important contribution to matching the model’s unemployment path but cannot be a full resolution of the low slope puzzle and the linearity puzzle.




Figure 24: Phase Diagram for the DMP Case with Congestion in Recruiting

### 5.3 Congestion externality

Here we consider adding the property that the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy is increasing in unemployment, to capture a congestion effect on recruiting cost. We introduce the function

$$\kappa(u) = \kappa^* \left( \frac{u}{u^*} \right)^\gamma \quad (10)$$

to make the recruiting cost rise with unemployment. We show how congestion depresses the recovery rate in the simple DMP model with conventional parameter values. We continue to take the job value  $J$  to be a constant—the downward slope of path of unemployment during the recovery is entirely the endogenous result of slow adjustment and not the result of improved incentives for job creation. If the crisis involved diminished incentives, those incentives snap back to normal at the beginning of the recovery.

With endogenous congestion, the recovery can be much slower. Figure 24 shows the effect of setting  $\gamma$ , the elasticity of the recruiting cost with respect to unemployment, to one. The locus of stationary unemployment remains the same, but the congestion cost bears more when unemployment is high, so the path from high initial unemployment to, ultimately, full employment, is vastly slower. The figure shows a multitude of tiny steps, each corresponding to a month.

It is clear that the story of the phase diagram only works if the congestion effect embodied in  $\kappa(u)$  is reasonably strong—enough to twist the  $J/\kappa(u)$  curve clockwise from flat to downward sloping, and lying close to the locus of stationary unemployment.






Figure 25: Recovery Path of Unemployment in the Congestion Model Compared to Actual Path

Figure 25 shows the model’s unemployment path for the most recent recovery along with the actual unemployment path. Parameter values for the model are  $\gamma = 0.95$  and  $\psi = 0.3$ . The model’s path more or less matches the slow pace of the decline of unemployment but is noticeably convex and fails to capture the linearity of the actual path.

### 5.3.1 Ideas about the congestion effect

Engbom (2018) builds a model containing a congestion effect from unemployment. Job-seekers expand the scope of their search when jobs become harder to find in a recession. Recruiting firms’ screening costs rise because of a higher volume of applications from job-seekers who are applying for less suitable jobs, on account of their widening scope. He cites recent evidence that screening costs, which rise in proportion to the number of applications, are a substantial fraction of total hiring costs. Advertising costs, which do not scale with applications, are relatively unimportant.

Molavi (2018) states “I show that a deterioration in the quality of the pool [of applicants] leads firms to post fewer vacancies and to demand a more positive signal of a workers ability before hiring the worker. When the pool becomes more adversely selected, these two effects conspire to depress the job-finding rates of all workers irrespective of their ability.”

Moscarini (2001) builds a model in which slack labor markets involve elevated levels of what he calls “excess worker reallocation. In the model, workers with specialized skills search

selectively and contact few vacancies, where they are likely to be hired; while workers with weak comparative advantage apply to any vacancy, driven by the low anticipated acceptance rate. The latter workers produce movements across job types, both job-to-job and through unemploymentexcess worker reallocation. He finds that in a tight labor market, comparative advantages dominate waiting costs and excess worker reallocation is lower and matches are more successful.

Lockwood (1991) considers a setup where employers may administer a test. When this happens in equilibrium, employers also consider unemployment duration as informative about how many times the job-seeker has flunked previous tests. When unemployment is higher, this problem may worsen, creating a congestion externality.

Blanchard and Diamond (1994) develop a “ranking” model of unemployment in which when firms receive multiple acceptable applications, they hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount of time. In the model, the exit rate from unemployment depends on duration, and the effect of duration is stronger the higher the rate of unemployment. “In a tight labour market, a long-term unemployed worker may be the only applicant at a given vacancy. In a depressed labour market, most vacancies receive many applications, so that the probability of being hired decreases quickly with duration.”

Eeckhout and Lindenlaub (2019) observe that, in a recession, the composition of job-seekers shifts toward the unemployed and away from on-the-job searchers. Incentives for job creation are diminished because the productivity of job-seekers is lower.

### 5.3.2 Other externalities

The channel behind the spillovers from a large sudden increase in the number of jobseekers depends on whether the increase is accompanied by a decline in the marginal product of labor. Typically, the literature considers a scenario in which the marginal product of labor declines. This depresses the incentives to create jobs and slows down the absorption of jobseekers via the decline in labor demand. We consider this possibility in the next subsection. Here we briefly consider how studies of local spillovers might identify a congestion externality along the lines of the model in this subsection.

We look to the literature on local labor markets for evidence. An ideal natural experiment is a situation when there is a large influx of jobseekers into a local labor that is exogenous to the local labor market conditions and leaves the marginal product of labor unchanged. Such an increase in jobseekers can occur as a result of job loss, that is, from the reduction in local labor supply, or as a result of inflows from OLF or a population increase, that is, from the increase in local labor supply. An example of a reduction in local labor supply is

a plant closing because of outsourcing of production overseas. An example of an increase in local labor supply is an influx of immigrants such as the Mariel boatlift.

Gathmann, Helm and Schonberg (2020) quantify the spillover effects of large local mass layoffs using administrative data on firms and workers in Germany. They find sizable and persistent negative effects on the regional economy: The regions generally, and especially firms producing in the same broad industry as the layoff plant, lose many additional jobs. Employment in these indirectly affected firms starts to decline one year after the mass layoff takes place. Four years after the initial layoffs, 35 percent of local employment losses stem from spillover effects in plants not directly affected by the mass layoff. The authors argue that the negative effect on other firms is the result of the loss of agglomeration externalities. In contrast, negative employment effects on workers employed in the region at the time of the mass layoff are considerably smaller because these workers are able to relocate to other regions. Vom Berge and Schmillen (2015) and Jofre-Monseny, Sanchez-Vidal and Viladecans-Marsal (2017) analyze the potential indirect effects of plant closures and do not find evidence for spillover effects. Gathmann and co-authors argue that this is because the size of the mass layoffs in these papers is much smaller.

Our reading of these papers is that they study the effect of local layoffs in terms of an overall external effect on other firms, without considering the separate effects on the marginal product of labor and the cost of recruiting workers. That distinction is relevant to identifying the source of the slow decline of unemployment during recoveries.

## 5.4 Impaired profitability of employment

Recall that  $T = J/\kappa$  and that  $J = P - W$ , the net benefit of the employment relationship to the employer. If some force depresses  $P$  by more than it depresses  $W$ ,  $J$  falls and  $T$  falls as well, assuming that the source of the decline in  $J$  does not also affect recruiting cost  $\kappa$ . Tightness falls, and unemployment rises, along the path set by its law of motion. One potential source of this effect is a crisis-induced cut in the availability of credit, which raises discount rates and thereby cuts  $J$ . As the availability of credit gradually returns back to normal, unemployment also returns to normal.

To measure the availability of credit, we use data from the Federal Reserve Board's survey of Senior Loan Officers. Respondents in the survey answer in terms of tightening and easing of commercial loan standards. We cumulate these answers using the statistical model in Hall (2011) to form an index of loan availability. The scale of the index is arbitrary. In Figure 26, we scale it to have the same standard deviation as unemployment and compare the scaled index to actual unemployment. The two variables move closely together.




Figure 26: Scaled Index of Loan Availability Compared to Unemployment Rate

To account for the effect of loan availability  $L$  in the model, the equation for the job-finding rate becomes

$$f = \psi \cdot (1 - \lambda L). \quad (11)$$

We pick the coefficient  $\lambda$  to give the best fit of the model's implied unemployment path following the financial crisis. Figure 27 shows the unemployment recovery path from the model in comparison to the actual path.

Among the models in this section, this one comes closest to matching the actual declining path of unemployment, but the model's path is somewhat more convex than the nearly linear path in the data.

## 5.5 Conclusions about the variants of the DMP model

In general, the models we reviewed in this section do not fully resolve the twin puzzles of low recovery speeds of unemployment and the linearity of the unemployment paths in recoveries. The simple DMP model with a job-finding rate calibrated to the high observed rate of monthly unemployment-to-job transitions is a disaster, as Cole and Rogerson (1999) observed early in the development of the model. Using an effective unemployment exit rate inferred from the 3-years histories of displaced workers improves the fit in both dimensions—lower initial slope of the unemployment path and less curvature—but still does not generate a straight line over the 10 year span in our example. The congestion model does somewhat




Figure 27: Comparison of Model’s Recovery Path of Unemployment to Actual Unemployment

better but still falls short on linearity. The model based on credit availability also falls short on linearity. We have spend some time checking combinations of these forces, but because none of them achieve the degree of linearity found in the data, no combination is fully successful.

## 6 Other Forces Operating during a Recovery

### 6.1 Other variables

Next we take a look at a variety of macro variables that may be involved in recoveries. These are policy instruments—government spending and monetary policy—and influences that might be considered exogenous determinants—productivity, labor-force growth, and the stock market.

*Government purchases.* Figure 28 displays consolidated government purchases of goods and services divided by the CBO’s potential GDP series. The dates of peaks in the employment rate appear along the bottom—not the peaks in the purchases series itself. Essentially all macroeconomic models agree that an increase in government purchases stimulates output. The figure shows that purchases in the first recovery, 1949 through 1953, grew rapidly because of the Korean War. The Reagan military buildup in the 1980s also accounted for rising purchases relative to potential GDP in that recovery—in all other recoveries, even the one




Figure 28: Annual Growth in Real Government Purchases of Goods and Services, as a Ratio to Potential GDP, by Recovery, and Total Growth during Each Recovery

in the 1960s containing the Viet Nam war, purchases failed to keep up with potential GDP. The conclusion with respect to those, notably including the most recent recovery, is that fiscal policy taking the form of deliberate expansion of purchases—such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—provided stimulus when the economy was weak. As the economy recovered, the stimulus was withdrawn. This influence was much greater, relative to potential GDP, in the current recovery, compared to earlier recoveries.

*Government transfers.* The US has large and effective countercyclical government transfer programs and practices. Figure 29 shows the history of dollar benefits in terms of our recovery chronology. We standardize the data by dividing by nominal disposable income. Some of the countercyclical pattern arises from automatic stabilizers—programs that enroll more dependents in bad times—and some from discretionary expansion of programs and creation of new ones—such as extending unemployment insurance benefits to cover more weeks.

The figure shows that there is a good deal of heterogeneity across the recoveries. Transfers declined remarkably in the first recovery, starting in 1949. In the next four recoveries, transfers grew relative to disposable income. In four of the recent five recoveries, transfers declined.

*Monetary policy.* The central instrument of monetary policy in the US is the Federal Reserve’s policy interest rate. The standard way to state its effect as an instrument is to define




Figure 29: Government Transfer Payments as a Ratio to Disposable Income, by Recovery, and Total Growth during the Recovery

it as the margin of the economy's natural or equilibrium short interest rate over the policy rate. To expand, the Fed depresses the policy rate and increases the margin. And to contract, the Fed raises the policy rate above the natural rate to drive the margin negative. Laubach and Williams (2003) is a widely used estimate of the natural short rate.

Figure 30 shows the average value of the expansionary margin of interest-rate policy, according to Laubach and Williams. The Fed has chosen net expansion in four expansions and net contraction in two. In the current recovery, the Fed has chosen substantial expansion, almost as much as in the recovery of second half of the 1970s. Oddly, the late 1970s were a period of high and rising inflation, so the Fed was failing in its duty to lean against the wind. The choice of high expansion in the current recovery is in accord with optimal policy, given slightly substandard inflation during the period.

As with the other policy instruments, we find heterogeneity in the setting of the Fed's interest-rate margin during the recoveries of the past 70 years.

## 6.2 Other driving forces during recoveries

*Financial discounts.* Forces other than macroeconomic policy may influence unemployment declines during recoveries. For example, a recent literature has described a relation between financial discounts and unemployment. See Hall (2017) in the context of the aggregate labor market and Kilic and Wachter (2018) and Kehoe, Lopez, Midrigan and Pastorino




Figure 30: The Expansionary Margin of Interest-Rate Policy

(n.d.) in general equilibrium. These papers consider DMP-type models of unemployment and events that alter economy-wide discount rates, thus changing the job-value, which is the present value of the contribution of a newly hired worker net of the wage paid to the worker. Discounts sometimes jump upward almost discontinuously, as they did immediately after the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008. The job value represents the incentive to recruiting. When it declines, the labor market slackens and unemployment rises. In the recovery phase, falling discounts raise the job value and unemployment falls.

According to principles of modern finance elucidated in Campbell and Shiller (1988), discount rates for risky future cash payouts are equal to the expected rates of returns associated with those payouts. In a recovery, the stock market rises, the price/dividend ratio rises, and expected rates of return decline. According to the literature linking financial events to the labor market, unemployment declines back to normal. Figure 31 shows the history of the ratio for recoveries since 1949. The ratio rose dramatically during the recovery of the 1990s. It fell substantially during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, but recovered during 2010, when unemployment was still rising. The ratio was Its relation to the chronology of the ratio of GDP to potential in earlier years is less apparent. A rising price/dividend ratio is sometimes important for a recovery, but does not explain the reliability of US business-cycle recoveries.

*Productivity growth.* Another aggregate influence of unquestioned importance for GDP growth is productivity growth. If the topic of this paper were real GDP growth in re-






Figure 31: Price/Dividend Ratio of the S&P 500, by Recovery, and Total Growth during the Recovery

coveries, productivity would receive top billing. But the relation of productivity growth to the gradual reduction of unemployment in recoveries is ambiguous and may well be small. Figure 32 shows that productivity growth tended to be high in recoveries through the 1980s, had a small comeback in the recovery starting in 2003, and had a spectacular shortfall in the current recovery. Overall, productivity growth tended to be irregular in recoveries.

*Variations in labor-force growth.* The DMP model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) has a constant labor force. Extensions to endogenous participation may involve positive or negative co-movements of participation and unemployment. Figure 33 shows that the participation rate grew during the years up to 1990 when the rising rate for women was a key factor for overall participation (to achieve a basic adjustment for demographic influences, the data refer to ages 25 through 54). In the three recoveries since 1990, participation was essentially unchanged during recoveries.

## 7 Implications for the Natural Rate of Unemployment or NAIRU

The natural rate of unemployment, also known as the NAIRU, is defined as the rate that would prevail absent recent dislocations from shocks. Another definition within New Keynesian thinking is the rate that would prevail in the absence of sticky wages and prices.




Figure 32: Annual Growth in Total Factor Productivity, by Recovery, and Total Growth during Each the Recovery




Figure 33: Percentage-Point Annual Change in Labor-Force Participation, by Recovery, and Total Percentage Change during Each Recovery

These definitions spring from a view that the economy vibrates around a stable underlying growth path. Our take is somewhat different. At widely spaced intervals—in recent decades, around 10 years—a significant adverse shock causes a substantial jump in the unemployment rate. There follows, the during relative calm period before the next bad shock, a predictable decline of about 0.55 percentage points per year in the unemployment rate. So we believe that there is not a constant natural rate, but a natural declining path of the rate.

## 8 Related Literature

Pries (2004) builds a DMP model that explains the high persistence of unemployment as the result of recurrent spells of unemployment following a shock. Once a job match is made, the parties are at risk of an adverse productivity realization that reveals that the match should end and the worker should return to the labor market. In normal times, most matches will have become known to be reliable and no longer at risk of being found unproductive. At random, a cloud may form over the labor market that calls into question the earlier belief that a match is good—the parties need to receive a new signal of reliability for a fraction of the existing matches. Some of the matches end immediately and the others are exposed to the possibility that they will be found to be unproductive from a later draw of productivity.

If the aggregate shock simply knocks out some of the existing matches, the model generates little persistence—the victims of the shock regain reliable employment almost as quickly as they would without the learning-by-experience feature of the model (see Pries’s Figure 3). The broader version of the shock, which induces the parties to wait to determine who are the job losers, makes the effect of the shock realistically persistent. Thus Pries has found a way to make the shock effectively persistent.

### 8.1 Cyclicity of the consequences of job loss

Davis and von Wachter (2011) find that the present-value losses for displacements that occur in recessions are nearly twice as large as for displacements in expansions. They conclude that that the present-value earnings losses associated with job displacement are very large, and they are highly sensitive to labor market conditions at the time of displacement.

Mueller (2017), using micro-data from the Current Population Survey, documents that in recessions the pool of unemployed shifts toward workers with high wages in their previous job and that these shifts are driven by the high cyclicity of separations for high-wage workers.

Fujita and Moscarini (2017) document that a large share of workers return to their previous employer after a jobless spell, and experience different unemployment and employment outcomes from job switchers. They add a recall option to a canonical search and matching

model and find that the recall option amplifies the cyclical volatility of new job-finding and separation probabilities. Fujita, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2020) argue that the labor market policy response to the pandemic must save aggregate matching capital.

## 8.2 Cyclicalities of recruiting intensity

Modestino, Shoag and Balance (2019), Modestino, Shoag and Balance (2016) and Hershbein and Kahn (2018) use data on the education and skill requirements of online job postings to study the relationship between the unemployment rate and job requirements. They argue that changes in the skill requirements of vacancies are cyclical. When job seekers are plentiful, firms become choosier and increase skill and educational requirements of vacancies. And, conversely, when job seekers are scarce, firms relax skill and educational requirements of vacancies. Modestino et al. (2019), Modestino et al. (2016) calculate that approximately 20 percent of the aggregate increase in upskilling during 2007-10 can be accounted for by their cyclical labor supply mechanism. The findings are consistent with evidence of pro-cyclical recruitment intensity provided by Davis et al. (2013) who find that in booms firms obtain more hires per vacancy than in recessions.

Hershbein and Kahn (2018) argue that not all upskilling during 2007-09 was cyclical and that some firms laid off workers during the downturn, invested in labor-saving technologies during the recovery and subsequently required higher skills from new hires than in 2007.

## 8.3 Heterogeneity in rates of growth of employment across recoveries

We noted early in this paper that the homogeneity of the rate of recovery of unemployment does not carry over to the rate of growth of employment, which is sensitive to variations in the growth of labor-force participation. Leduc and Liu (2020) modify the DMP model by introducing a cost of creating vacancies, which results in variations in the growth of employment even if participation is constant.

# 9 Concluding Remarks

We propose a rather different notion of the recovery of the US economy from a recessionary shock. The shock leaves a legacy of high unemployment. In the usual view, unemployment is high because there is a shortfall of demand. As time passes, demand recovers and unemployment returns to normal. In our view, unemployment remains high and declines only gradually because of frictions in rebuilding employment. We believe that the frictions

comprise low effective rates of movement back into jobs and congestion externalities that raise the effective cost of job creation. High lending standards immediately after a crisis are another friction that dissipates slowly during a recovery.

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