For a discussion of financial modernization and the too-big-too-fail problem.
Top of the Ninth Readings
Published September 1, 2000 | September 2000 issue
Testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 17, 1998.
Testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, April 28, 1999.
For a plan to fully eliminate protection of uninsured depositors:
Bankers Roundtable (1997), Deposit Insurance Reform in the Public Interest (Washington D.C.: Bankers Roundtable)
For a discussion of making credible commitments through explicit contracts with policymakers:
Carl E. Walsh, "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review 85 (March 1995). pp. 150-167.
For a discussion of plans that try to reduce the incentives to provide bailouts:
Thomas Hoenig, "Rethinking Financial Regulation," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 81 (2)(1996), pp.5-13.
Mark Flannery,"Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform," Journal of Financial Services Research, 16 (2/3), pp. 101-117.
Frederic Mishkin, "Moral Hazard and Reform of the Government Safety Net," paper presented at "Lessons from the Recent Global Financial Crises," sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Oct. 1, 1999.
Ron Feldman and Arthur Rolnick, "Fixing FDICIA: A Plan to Address the Too-Big-Too-Fail Problem," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report, March 1998.
Federal Reserve System Study Group on Subordinated Notes and Debentures, "Using Subordinated Debt as an Instrument of Market Discipline," Staff Study 172, December 1999.
For a discussion of appointing "conservative" policymakers:
Kenneth Bogoff, "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (November 1985) pp. 1169-1190.