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Pranab Bardhan

University of California, Berkeley

Anusha Nath

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Sandip Mitra

Indian Statistical Institute

Dilip Mookherjee

Boston University

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How do Voters Respond to Welfare vis-a-vis Public Good Programs?

An Empirical Test of Political Clientelism^{*}

Pranab Bardhan,[†] Sandip Mitra,[‡] Dilip Mookherjee,[§] and Anusha Nath[¶]

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Abstract

Using rural household survey data from West Bengal, we find that voters respond positively to excludable government welfare benefits but not to local public good programs, while reporting having benefited from both. Consistent with these voting patterns, shocks to electoral competition induced by exogenous redistricting of villages resulted in upper-tier governments manipulating allocations across local governments only for excludable benefit programs. Using a hierarchical budgeting model, we argue these results provide credible evidence of the presence of clientelism rather than standard political economy theories of programmatic politics.

Keywords: Clientelism; Public goods; Welfare programs; Voting

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[†]University of California, Berkeley. *email:* bardhan@econ.berkeley.edu

[‡]Indian Statistical Institute. *email:* sandipisi@gmail.com

[§]Boston University. *email:* dilipm@bu.edu

[¶]Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. *email:* Anusha.Nath@mpls.frb.org

1 Introduction

Political clientelism is commonly believed to undermine the functioning of democracy in many middle-and low-income countries.¹ Voters are effectively coerced to express political support for current incumbents by the threat of losing access to excludable government benefits, thereby diluting incentives of elected officials to be accountable and to deliver non-excludable public goods. Like most other forms of corruption it is hard to detect and it is equally difficult to provide reliable estimates of its systemic consequences.

The key defining characteristic of clientelism is that excludable benefits are allocated by incumbents to individual citizens *conditional* on their political support (Hicken (2011), Stokes et al. (2013)).² This is in contrast to programmatic politics where, owing to strict eligibility based rules, delivery of private benefits to individual citizens are not subject to political discretion. As its name indicates, programmatic politics still leaves room for elected officials to exercise discretion over allocation of infrastructure programs across regions for electoral advantage or on the basis of past voting patterns (allowing ‘pork-barrel politics’ to prevail).

In this paper, we provide evidence of implicit *quid pro quo* arrangements between parties and individual citizens under clientelism by examining the pattern of benefit allocation across villages and the subsequent voting behavior of households upon receipt of these benefits. This approach is in contrast to various forms of indirect evidence provided in the comparative politics literature, such as the existence of local party brokers that mediate such trades on the basis of their personal connections with individual citizens (Stokes (2005), Kitschelt et al. (2007), Björkman (2014)), or positive correlations between citizen access to benefits and proximity to party networks and ideology (Stokes (2005), Stokes et al. (2013), Dunning and Nilekani (2013), Calvo and Murillo (2013)). While these forms of evidence are suggestive, they are also consistent with non-clientelistic forms of vote mobilization. For instance, Zarazaga (2014) conducts surveys of party brokers in Argentina and shows that many of their activities are consistent with programmatic politics, such as organizing political rallies and canvassing individual voters to advertise party policy platforms, or communicating information regarding voter preferences to party officials.³ Moreover, proximity of voter connections

¹See Stokes (2005), Kitschelt et al. (2007), Hicken (2011), Stokes et al. (2013), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2020).

²This also distinguishes clientelism from vote-buying (unconditional pre-election gifts or bribes intended to influence votes via persuasion, gratitude or feelings of reciprocity) and turnout-buying (wherein party brokers subsidize or facilitate turnout of voter groups expected to vote in favor of their party).

³Schneider (2014) conducts surveys of party brokers in an Indian state and finds that they are not able to guess

and ideology to parties are unlikely to be exogenous determinants of their access to government benefits, being subject to concerns for reverse causality or omitted variable bias. Attempts to overcome these identification problems using randomized field experiments are limited. A notable exception is Wantchekon (2003), which consists of an experiment in Benin which randomized policy platforms announced by competing Presidential candidates that differed with regard to promised private rather than public goods to different voter audiences. While the experiment showed that private good promises generated higher votes, this could be consistent with programmatic politics if voter preferences were biased in favor of private goods.

We begin by providing a theoretical model of electoral competition between two candidates that distinguishes between clientelism and programmatic politics on the basis of whether incumbents can condition delivery of private benefits to individual voters on their past political support. The model generates testable predictions which helps distinguish clientelism from programmatic politics. First, votes of individual citizens are affected only by receipt of current private benefits under clientelism, whereas in programmatic politics it is equally affected by receipt of both private and public benefits. Second, in a hierarchical system of local government, clientelism affects the specific way in which incumbents are politically motivated to manipulate program grants to local governments in response to changes in political competition. Our model predicts that an exogenous increase in political competition will motivate upper tier incumbents to expand budgets to *aligned* local governments controlled by the same party, and contract it for those controlled by the opposing party. The hypothesis of clientelism-based distortions then translates into a prediction that only private benefit programs will be manipulated in this fashion.

We test these predictions using a panel rural household survey in the Indian state of West Bengal, containing benefits reported by households by year covering a seven year period 2004-2011, and political support for different parties in a secret ballot poll that we conducted in 2011. In West Bengal, as in most other states in India, the lowest tier of local government is the *gram panchayat* (GP) and the next upper-tier is the *panchayat samiti* (PS). The GP is responsible for allocating various private benefit programs to villages and households within their jurisdiction, besides planning and administration of local infrastructure projects. The

voter's political preferences over and above information contained in observable household attributes, contrary what is assumed in accounts of clientelism. Auerbach and Thachil (2020) interview slum leaders in India and find that they have limited ability in monitoring co-partisan and co-ethnic voters and hence select clients who are better connected overall within the slum. This benefits the leaders' general reputation and is consistent with program politics where party brokers play an information gathering role within local communities.

PS provides budgetary and technical approvals for these projects. This top-down hierarchical system provides considerable discretionary power to PS officials in project approvals and allocation of funds for different programs across GPs. This applies equally to (private) welfare and infrastructure (local public good) programs. The welfare programs include different private benefits: employment, subsidized loans, farm inputs, low-income housing, sanitation and food items. The infrastructure programs involve construction of local public goods: primarily roads, and also irrigation and water programs. In addition to eliciting detailed information of benefits received, each household survey ended with households casting a ballot. In this “secret ballot,” the head of household marked his or her preferred choice on a sheet containing the symbols of competing political parties and cast it into a ballot box in private. We show that the household ballot responses are positively correlated with actual vote shares of rival parties (aggregated at the corresponding constituency level for state assembly elections held the same year); suggesting that they are a reasonable proxy for how households actually voted. The richness of data on receipt of different types of benefits as well as on proxy voting behavior allows us to test the relative effectiveness of private versus local public goods in generating votes for incumbents.

Our empirical analysis is carried out in two steps. In the first exercise, we examine variation in local-government program scales resulting from changes in political competition. Following [Nath \(2015\)](#), we isolate exogenous variation in political competition by utilizing the redrawing of boundaries between state legislative-assembly constituencies implemented in 2007 (and announced in December 2006) by a politically neutral State Delimitation Commission composed of members of the national judiciary. The Indian Constitution imposes many restrictions on the process to ensure that redistricting cannot be manipulated by political parties to extract partisan benefits, which [Iyer and Reddy \(2013\)](#) verify using data from two other Indian states. We find similar evidence for West Bengal using our data.

To test the theoretical predictions, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to compare changes in GPs that were redistricted in 2007 into more contested assembly constituencies (treatment) with corresponding changes in other GPs (constituting the control group). We begin our analysis by defining two treatment groups. Villages in both these groups were redistricted to more competitive constituencies but varied in alignment. We focus on the electoral term 2004-2008 since alignment did not change over this period. To provide justification for the DID specification, we show that each of the treatment groups and the control group did not differ significantly with respect to relevant village characteristics or variables reflecting possible motives for political manipulation (incumbency, representation

in the Delimitation Commission or low caste reservation status). Moreover, we verify the absence of pre-2007 trend differences in private and public benefit distributions.

Our results show that after 2007, villages in treated-nonaligned GPs experienced a 1.75 standard deviation (s.d.) smaller change in scale of private benefit programs compared to the control group. At the same time the gap between the changes in the two treated groups varying by alignment grew by 2.7 s.d.. Both were significant at the 1% level. For public benefits, in contrast, the corresponding differences were negligible (less than 0.01 s.d.) and statistically insignificant. We also test a more demanding set of predictions of the theory concerning effects of redistricting to different combinations of competition changes and alignment. We check robustness of these results to alternative definitions and measures of benefits, and conduct placebo tests validating the underlying identification assumptions.

Our second empirical exercise examines how political support at the household level responded to private and public benefits they received. An OLS regression of household support for the GP incumbent party in the 2011 survey shows that one standard deviation increase in private benefits during the previous three years was associated with a 2.4% higher likelihood of supporting the incumbent party at the GP level, significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, reported household benefits (standardized) from a local road program in those years was associated with a statistically insignificant 1% decrease in support.

The OLS results are subject to possible reverse causality bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity both within and across villages. For example, anticipated voting patterns can affect the allocation of benefits as incumbents could target loyal supporters (generating a positive bias), or they could target swing voters (generating a negative bias). To correct for such biases, we provide IV estimates using a ‘supply-side’ instrument for the scale of programs at the GP level: the average program scale in other villages in the same district, in the spirit of [Levitt and Snyder Jr \(1997\)](#). We interact these with fixed household characteristics such as caste, landlessness, education, and religion (significant determinants of within-GP targeting) to predict the delivery of benefits to individual households. We include district fixed effects in the regression, to remove biases owing to possible unobserved heterogeneity across districts.

The resulting IV estimate of effect of private benefits on household support for the incumbent turns out to be substantially larger than the OLS effect, amounting to a 14% higher likelihood of support for one standard deviation increase in benefit (p-value less than .05). The corresponding IV estimate of the voting effect of a road benefit is negative and statistically insignificant. Hence the results at the household level mirror the patterns of manipulation of program scales at the GP level, in line with the predictions of the clientelistic model.

One of the main contributions of this paper is to develop and implement a test for the presence and consequence of clientelistic distortions in local governments. This is a particular form of political manipulation of targeting of government expenditures on the basis of their vote generating impacts rather than genuine need. The extent of these distortions appear to be quantitatively large. While we do not provide direct evidence of under-supply of public goods, our results imply that elected officials lack the incentive to supply local public goods. Moreover, this paper provides the foundation for important policy-relevant questions such as: are political targeting incentives for private benefits progressive? What are the consequences of removing discretion of upper tier officials and replacing it with a formula-based program for GP grants? A subsequent paper ([Mookherjee and Nath \(2020\)](#)) draws on the data and analysis of this paper to examine these questions.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related literature in more detail, while Section 3 describes the institutional context and data used. Section 4 presents the theoretical model. Section 5 presents the empirical results for the GP benefit scale and effects on household votes. Section 6 discusses the plausibility of alternative explanations, while Section 7 concludes.

2 Related Literature

In the previous section, we discussed how our paper is related to the literature on clientelism in comparative politics. This section focuses on related papers in political economy. Our focus on political clientelism contrasts with those studying social clientelism involving patronage of poor households by traditional elites rather than political incumbents in India and Pakistan ([Anderson et al. \(2015\)](#), [Beg \(2020\)](#)). It is also distinguished from studies of vote-buying involving unconditional pre-election gifts from political candidates to voters in the hope of swaying their votes ([Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. \(2012\)](#), [Gonzalez Ocantos et al. \(2014\)](#), [Khemani \(2015\)](#), [Leight et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Vicente and Wantchekon \(2009\)](#)). Our focus is on the public expenditure allocation consequences of political clientelism, rather than underlying enforcement mechanisms utilizing local brokers ([Finan and Schechter \(2012\)](#), [Larreguy et al. \(2016\)](#)).

The main contribution of our paper is to provide evidence for political clientelism by showing that voters respond differentially to delivery of welfare programs compared to infrastructure programs. There is an extensive literature looking at political manipulation of funds for local infrastructure ([Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro \(2008\)](#), [Brollo and Nannicini](#)

(2012), Finan and Mazzocco (2016), Levitt and Poterba (1999), Stashko (2018)). Another set of papers examines the effects of specific private benefits programs on voter behavior in middle and low income countries (De La O (2013); Labonne (2013); Manacorda et al. (2011); Pop-Eleches et al. (2012); Brollo et al. (2017)). However, none of these papers compare voter responsiveness *across* private and public program benefits.

Levitt and Snyder Jr (1997) is the only paper we are aware of that compares voter responsiveness to delivery of welfare and infrastructure programs respectively. They provide an IV estimate of US federal spending on votes in House districts, using as an instrument the level of spending in all other districts in the same state. We use a similar instrument in our household-level analysis and, like them, find a large discrepancy between OLS and IV effects. They find a \$100 increase in per capita spending on ‘high variation programs’ (including local infrastructure) resulted in a 2% increase in votes for the incumbent, while spending on ‘low variation’ programs (consisting of private transfer programs involving direct payments to citizens) resulted in a 0.2% reduction. This pattern is exactly the opposite of what we find. The discrepancy can be explained by the difference in institutional settings: in the US most private transfers are based on strict individual eligibility rules, and elected politicians exercise discretion mainly over inter-jurisdictional allocation of infrastructure funds. Hence there is no scope for the kind of clientelistic practices we argue prevailed in West Bengal.

Our result concerning the heterogenous impact of political competition on allocation of private benefits across politically aligned and non-aligned regions in India is consistent with evidence found in Dey and Sen (2016), Gupta and Mukhopadhyay (2016) and Shenoy and Zimmerman (2020). In the context of intergovernmental transfer of funds between central and state/municipal governments, the importance of alignment in close elections is documented in Arulampalam et al. (2009) for India, in Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for Brazil, and in Corvalan et al. (2018) for Chile. There is also a related set of papers that provides evidence of ethnic favoritism or home bias of elected officials (Burgess et al. (2015), Hodler and Raschky (2014), Hoffmann et al. (2017)). These papers, however, focus on personal motives of upper-level officials rather than political incentives.

3 Context and Data

Political Environment and Government Hierarchy. During the period of our study (2004-2011), there were two principal political parties competing in West Bengal: the Left Front (LF) coalition led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the All India Trinamool

Congress (TMC). The Left Front dominated elected offices corresponding to village, district, and state governments from 1977 to 2011 and lost its majority in the state assembly to the TMC in 2011. Table 1 presents official voting outcomes for the constituencies included in our sample. Between the 2006 and 2011 state assembly elections, the Left Front’s vote share dropped from 50% to 42% while the TMC’s share rose from 24% to 35%.

Table 1: Official Election Results and Post-Election Poll Responses

Party Vote Shares (%)	Official Election Results*		Results from Poll Responses	
	2006	2011	2004	2011
TMC	24	35	11	45
Left Front	50	42	58	34
INC	16	12	19	12
Others	11	12	5	2
Voter Turnout (%)	84	86		
Didn’t Respond			7	7

Notes: This table compares the changes in share of votes between 2004 and 2011 for main parties in the post-election straw survey poll with the changes in official vote shares between 2006 and 2011 assembly elections. The vote shares for the Left Front from the post-election survey polls are aggregated at the assembly-constituency level. The official election results are reported only for constituencies in which the survey was conducted.

Figure 1 shows how Left Front dominance progressively gave way to TMC dominance across successive elections in 2006, 2009 and 2011 at the assembly, parliamentary and assembly elections respectively. Hence, it is reasonable to characterize our context as featuring electoral competition between two political parties.

Next we describe the structure of government. India is a federal state with legislative, administrative, and executive powers divided between the central and state governments. Each state has a hierarchy of administrative governments and elected bodies. A large range of benefit programs are administered, with upper-level governments raising the funds to pay for them and devolving spending authority to lower level governments. Program budgets flow down the hierarchy. District-level governments, *zilla parishads* (ZPs), allocate funds to middle-tier governments at the ‘block’ level, which comprise an elected body *panchayat samiti* (PS) and appointed bureaucrats in the Block Development Offices. The middle tier then allocates funds to bottom-tier *gram panchayats* (GPs) within their block. Finally, the elected GP bodies distribute benefits to households across and within villages in their jurisdiction. Unlike the US where allocation of public goods across local governments is discretionary and private benefits are based on strict eligibility criteria, both local public goods allocation and private

Figure 1: Changes in Electoral Outcomes for the Left Front

Note. This figure plots voting outcomes at the assembly constituency level for three different elections, as indicated at the top of each map. The constituencies in red were won by the Left Front party and the ones in green were won by the TMC party. The figure shows how Left Front dominance progressively gave way to TMC dominance across successive elections.

benefits are discretionary in West Bengal and most other Indian states.

Our analysis will focus on the bottom two tiers: the PS at the block level, and the GP at the village level (see Figure 2). There are approximately 20 PSs in each district; each PS oversees roughly 10 GPs, and each GP allocates benefits among 10-15 villages each. Each village in turn includes about 200-400 households. Council members and their chairpersons (Pradhans) are directly elected in each PS and GP. The area covered by a PS coincides or overlaps to a high degree with a state-assembly constituency, which elects a member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) every five years. During the period 2004-2011, state assembly elections were held in 2006 and 2011, and local government (PS,GP) elections in 2003 and 2008. Elections to the national Parliament were held in 2009. All elections are first-past-the post. Incumbency at the PS and MLA levels are positively correlated; for 70% of GPs in our sample the corresponding MLA was from the same party that controlled the PS. As Figure 2 shows, there are 45 PS's in our data, of which 39 were controlled by the LF. Political control at the PS tends to be positively correlated with political control at the GP level, but this correlation is not perfect. This results in variations in alignment of political control between

the two tiers.

Figure 2: Bottom Tiers of Local Government Hierarchy and Redistricting

Note. This figure depicts the hierarchy of local elected bodies and jurisdictions. The *Panchayat Samiti* comprises of an elected body at the middle-tier level of government. The middle-tier allocates funds to bottom-tier *gram panchayats* (GPs) within their block. The elected GP bodies distribute benefits across and within villages in their jurisdiction. The *Majority* variables are defined according to 2003 panchayat election results. Redistricting is at the assembly-constituency level. *HC Redistricted* refers to those cases where the village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with a smaller gap in vote share between winner and runner up in the 2006 state assembly election. *LC Redistricted* refers to those cases where a village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with an equal or a larger gap in vote share between winner and runner up.

Survey Data. We obtain information on benefits received by households and a proxy measure of their voting behavior from a household survey carried out in 2011.⁴ The sample was randomly selected (stratified by landownership) from 89 villages in 57 GPs spread through all districts of West Bengal, excluding Kolkata and Darjeeling (owing to the relative

⁴The households in the sample are the same set of households that were surveyed by Bardhan et al. (2014) in 2004.

lack of agricultural occupations in these two districts). Approximately 25 households were surveyed in each village. Table 2 provides a summary of the demographic characteristics for the 2,402 households. Half the households own no land; three out of four own less than 1.5 acres of agricultural land and their heads had less than 8 years of schooling.

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Demographics

Agri Land Owned (acres)	No. of Households	Characteristics of Head of Households				
		Avg. Age	% Males	Years of Schooling	% SC/ST	% in Agriculture
Landless	1214	45	88	6.6	37.4	26
0-1.5	658	48	88	7.8	38.9	65
1.5-2.5	95	56	92	10.8	22.4	82
2.5-5	258	58	93	11.1	27.1	72
5-10	148	60	89	12.5	26.1	66
> 10	29	59	100	13.9	30.9	72
All	2402	49	89	8.0	35.4	47

Note. This table provides demographic characteristics of the head of households (who were the main respondents to the survey) in 2004. *% Agriculture* refers to percentage of household heads whose primary occupation is agriculture.

We now describe the major benefit programs. Administrative data on the programs we study does not provide the level of disaggregation we need. Moreover, there are concerns about reliability of administrative data for these programs (Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013)). In order to obtain information on benefits at the household level, we surveyed heads of households and asked them to report the major benefits they received from the local governments. Specifically, they were asked if their household had received benefits from different programs, in each year between 2004-2011. Many of the programs listed created benefits that were clearly private (i.e., household-specific) in nature, including (a) *employment* in programs such as Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana, MGNREGA and MPLADS; (b) *minikits* providing farmers with seeds and fertilizers at highly subsidized rates; (c) *subsidized credit*; (d) *land reforms* consisting of receipt of land titles or registration of tenancy contracts; (e) *house, toilet* - lumpsum transfer to households for house or toilet construction; and (f) *Below Poverty Line (BPL)* cards, which identify poor households and entitle them to subsidized food grains and other household items. Road and irrigation projects comprised local public goods. Some programs like drinking water could be classified as either private or public, depending on relative distance of different households from the location of the tap. Our default classification

is to consider them private. We later check robustness of the results when they are classified as public benefits. For more details on these individual programs, see Appendix Table A2.

Table 3: Summary Statistics: GP-Disbursed Benefits

	Average Per-Household Benefits		
	(2004-2006)	(2007-2008)	(2009-2011)
Any Benefit	0.82	1.53	1.68
Private Benefits	0.28	0.21	0.24
Employment*	0.13	0.12	0.09
Minikits	0.05	0.01	0.03
House or Toilet	0.04	0.01	0.02
BPL Cards	0.04	0.04	0.06
Drinking Water	0.01	0.03	0.02
Credit	0.00	0.00	0.00
Public Benefits	0.25	0.13	0.39
Road	0.18	0.13	0.39
Irrigation	0.07	0.00	0.00
Other Benefits	0.02	0.01	0.01

**Employment* includes panchayat-provided employment, MNREGA, and MPLAD employment.

Note. This table presents the per-household benefits averaged for three time periods: 2004-2006 (pre-redistricting), 2007-2008 (post redistricting), and 2009-2011 (post 2008 panchayat elections) respectively. For private benefits, we show the average number of benefits reported per household. Public benefits are imputed from survey responses as follows: a village is assumed to have had a road/irrigation project built in any given year if at least one household in that village reports benefitting from such a project that year, and all households in the village are then assumed to have received such a project in that year. *Other Benefits* includes *barga* (property rights), *patta* (registration of tenants), training, and relief. Appendix Table A2 provides details of government programs corresponding to the benefits listed in this table.

Table 3 provides average levels of different benefit programs for three sub-periods: pre-redistricting (2004-06), and two post-redistricting sub-periods (2007-08, 2009-11) separated by panchayat elections held in 2008 which changed patterns of party alignment. As much of our focus is on GP program budgets approved by higher level officials, we provide data on the scale of these programs estimated on the basis of household reports. For each type of private benefit, the table provides the average number of benefits reported per household. For public benefits (village roads and irrigation), benefits are imputed to all households in a village in any given year when at least one household reported benefitting from the corresponding type of benefit in that year. In the appendix, we show robustness of the results when we use actual reports of each households for whether they benefitted from public goods. Among private benefits, we see that employment programs recorded the largest number of beneficiaries,

accounting for nearly half of all benefits. Among public benefits, road programs comprised the vast majority. The scale of private benefits was slightly larger than of public benefits prior to 2008, with the opposite being true during 2009-11. In this table, we also provide average number of ‘other benefits’ which comprises of *barga* (sharecroppers’ rights to share of produce and protection against eviction), *patta* (deeds assigning property rights to land), flood relief, and vocational training. These constitute a small portion of overall benefits received by households and we include them under private benefits in robustness checks.

We construct political support data from ballots cast by heads of household. The process simulated the official "secret ballot" voting process. The households were shown sample ballots to assure them that names of the respondents would not appear, and asked if they were willing to participate. More than 99% agreed, who were then given the ballot and a locked box. They were allowed to go into a separate room, cast their vote by putting their ballots in the locked box and then return the box to the interviewer. The survey was conducted shortly after assembly elections in 2011. We compared the result of survey voting in 2011 (and in the 2004 survey round) to official voting outcomes at the Assembly Constituency level over this period. As seen in Table 1, vote shares in our survey ballots shifted in favor of the TMC in a similar way, though larger in magnitude than the observed shift in actual vote share. This difference in magnitude is not surprising, since the sample (third and fourth columns in Table 1) covers a small fraction of the population voting in the corresponding electoral constituencies (represented in the first two columns).⁵

One concern with using household ballots is that voters may systematically misrepresent their voting choices. To check its reliability, we compare the share of votes for the Left Front from the survey data with the official Election Commission data for assembly elections. The vote shares for the Left Front from household ballots are aggregated at the assembly-constituency level. We pool the two rounds of survey data and two assembly-election results in 2006 and 2011. Figure 3 plots vote share aggregated from survey data against the corresponding actual shares in the assembly elections.⁶ The correlation is 0.57 and significant at the 1% level. Since data on actual votes at the individual level is not available, we will use ballot responses of household heads as a proxy for how they actually voted.

Redistricting. To isolate exogenous variations in political competition at the GP/village level, we utilize information about redistricting of assembly constituencies that caused some

⁵The state legislative assembly consists of approximately 200 rural constituencies, with a constituency corresponding roughly to 50,000 households. Our sample only has 2400 households across all rural constituencies.

⁶These are comparable to results for Sierra Leone in [Casey \(2015\)](#) who also uses poll survey responses as a proxy for votes.

Figure 3: Vote Share for the Left Front: Household Ballots vs. Assembly Elections

Note. This scatter plot compares the share of votes for the Left Front in the household survey ballots (x-axis) with the official Election Commission data for assembly elections (y-axis). The vote shares for the Left Front from the household ballots are aggregated at the assembly-constituency level. We pool two rounds of survey data and two assembly-election results (2006 and 2011). The correlation coefficient is 0.57 and significant at the 1% level.

GPs to be assigned to a different constituency in 2007. Electoral constituency boundaries for parliamentary and state assembly elections are periodically redrawn in order to equalize the population sizes of constituencies. This was the case in all Indian states following the 2001 census, when redistricting took place based on changes in census population figures between 1981 and 2001. The previous redistricting took place three decades earlier. The Election Commission of India set up a three member Delimitation Commission for each state, comprising a retired chief justice, a member of the Election Commission of India, and the state election commissioner. An advisory committee consisting of five MPs and five state-assembly representatives representing different political parties provided input into the process. The state redistricting commission follows transparency and fairness rules concerning the redistricting process, including holding public hearings and addressing complaints. The new boundaries went into effect in West Bengal in late 2006. We therefore treat 2004-2006 as pre-redistricting years and 2007-2011 as post-redistricting years. [Iyer and Reddy \(2013\)](#) studied redistricting in two other Indian states and found no evidence of violation of the mandated rules. They also found that the outcomes were politically neutral, with few exceptions (which arose with regard to redrawing constituency boundaries for incumbents serving on the advisory committee).

In our sample, 26 out of 89 villages were redistricted. The bottom layer of Figure 2 gives the breakdown of redistricted villages in our sample across jurisdictions classified by political control of the PSs and GPs (in the 2003 panchayat elections) and whether the redistricting was to a more or less competitive constituency (i.e. with a smaller difference in vote shares between the winner and runner-up in the 2006 Assembly election). Of the villages that were redistricted, 13 were ‘moved’ to a more competitive constituency and 13 were ‘moved’ to a less competitive constituency. Figure 4 shows the pattern of changes in competitiveness generated by redistricting in our sample.

Figure 4: Change in Competition Due to Redistricting

Note. This figure shows the pattern of changes in competitiveness generated by redistricting in our sample. The horizontal axis represents the victory margin (difference in vote share between the winner and runner-up in the 2006 Assembly elections) in the original constituency to which a GP/village was assigned prior to 2007, while the vertical axis represents the victory margin in the newly defined constituency following 2007. Non-redistricted GPs are represented by the green dots, lying along the 45 degree line since they were assigned to the same constituency. *High Competition (HC) Redistricted* GPs are denoted by blue dots which all lie below the line of equality, and *Low Competition (LC) Redistricted* GPs by the brown dots lying above.

In our subsequent analysis, we partition redistricted villages into different ‘treatment’ groups depending on alignment and change in competitiveness, and test predictions of the theoretical model concerning differences in benefit flows between them and relative to the residual control group.

4 Model

We focus on two tiers in the local government hierarchy: the higher tier is a block managed by a PS which corresponds to an assembly constituency in the elections. A representative constituency $C_i, i = 1, 2, \dots$ has a jurisdiction consisting of GPs that distribute benefits in villages $v \in C_i$. To simplify the exposition, we assume the jurisdiction of a GP consists of a single village. Let n_v denote the share of village v in the population of C_i .

Elections at constituency and GP levels take place at the end of every period $t = 1, 2, \dots$. In what follows, we focus on resource-allocation decisions made at date t by incumbents (officials elected at the end of date $t - 1$) at each level of government, which are followed by elections at the end of date t to select officials in power at date $t + 1$. Two political parties L and T compete in both these elections. In period t , constituency C_i is controlled by either the L party ($I_i = 1$) or the T party ($I_i = -1$) as a result of the outcome of the election at the end of $(t - 1)$. Elected officials at assembly level follow the mandate of their party in allocating budgets for various programs to GPs. At t , village v has a GP that is controlled by either the L party ($I_v = 1$) or the T party ($I_v = -1$). Let η_i denote $\sum_{v' \in C_i} n_{v'} I_{v'}$, which is positive (resp. negative) if the L (resp. T) party has above-average control of the villages in the constituency.

Households within any village belong to different socio-economic groups $g = 1, \dots, G$. The demographic share of group g in village v is denoted by μ_{vg} . Members of each group have identical preferences for benefits. There are K different benefit programs; some deliver public (non-excludable) goods, while others distribute private goods. Benefits are indivisible: each resident receives either one unit or none. Receipt of benefit k generates a utility of β_{kg} for a member of g . Budgeting is top-down: for each program k , in period t , the GP is assigned a budget or per capita program scale of B_{kv} units by the upper tier constituency C_i . If the benefit is a public good, every resident receives the same number of units (B_{kv}).

While private benefits could be recurring or one-time, we will initially ignore this distinction; assume for now that all private benefits are recurring and randomly distributed via lottery within socio-economic groups.⁷ The decision made by the GP then reduces to allocating the assigned budget across different groups (represented by π_{kg} , the fraction of each group g that receives benefit k). For the incumbent party, these decisions pertain to actual budgets for

⁷A household's entitlement and demand for a recurring benefit (such as employment or a loan) is the same at all dates, irrespective of receipts of the benefit at previous dates. Hence every household is potentially eligible to receive a recurring benefit. For a one time benefit (such as low income housing, or BPL cards), a household that has already received one in the past is not entitled to another unit in the future.

allocations in the current year, rather than a commitment to a post-election policy platform. Hence we do not make any Downsian assumption of pre-commitment to policy platform for the incumbent. For the challenger, however, the decision corresponds to announcement of a future policy it promises to enact if elected.

Let $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}$ denote the set of public and private benefits, respectively. In period t , the incumbent party $p = L, T$ controlling the GP selects a policy π_{kg}^p , the fraction of group g residents that will receive benefit $k = 1, \dots, K$, satisfying the feasibility conditions $\pi_{kg}^p = B_{kv}$ for all $k \in \mathcal{P}$, and $\sum_g \mu_{vg} \pi_{kg}^p = B_{kv}$ for each $k \in \mathcal{R}$.

Given an allocated program budget $B_{ki}, k = 1, \dots, K$ from the district government at the third tier, the party controlling constituency C_i at the upper tier selects an allocation B_{kv} across villages in its jurisdiction, satisfying the budget constraint $\sum_{v \in C_i} n_v B_{kv} = B_{ki}, k = 1, \dots, K$. We take as given the budgetary allocation across constituencies. A previous version of this paper showed that the analysis of the two-tier model could be extended to three tiers (i.e., endogenizing constituency allocations received from district-level governments) while generating similar results. So we focus on the simpler two-tier model here.

As mentioned previously, budgeting is top-down: in the first stage of the game, the party controlling each constituency receives a budget from the district and allocates it among different GPs in its jurisdiction. This allocation determines the distribution of public benefits across villages. For private goods, at the second stage of the budgeting game, each GP allocates the assigned budget among different socio-economic groups within the village.

Finally, at the end of t , elections are held at both GP and constituency levels. Households in each village cast a vote for either party in elections at both levels, subject to beliefs specified below. Below, we describe alternative specifications of these electoral contests, which corresponds to programmatic politics and clientelism. In both versions, elected officials at either tier seek to maximize the probability of their party's victory in the next election.

We study subgame perfect equilibria of the three-stage game (subject to the postulated behavioral restriction on voter beliefs). This approach requires us to work backward, starting with voting at the third stage.

4.1 Voting under programmatic politics

First consider a standard model of “programmatic politics” without clientelism (Dixit and Londregan (1995), Grossman and Helpman (1996)). Voting is retrospective: for the incumbent party, the current distribution pattern π_{kg} is what voters expect in period $t + 1$ if it were

to be re-elected. For its opponent, it is the electoral platform discounted by a “credibility” parameter $(1 - \alpha)$ smaller than one, thus generating an electoral advantage for the current incumbent. This is because the platform of the challenger consists of a promise, which is compared by voters with what the incumbent is currently providing.

Households vote partly on the basis of the utility of the benefits they expect, and partly on the basis of the loyalty they feel toward each party (based on historical attachment, identity, or candidate personality). Suppose L is the incumbent in the GP. Relative loyalty $\tilde{\theta}$ to the L party is uniformly distributed within group g in village v with constant “swing” density $\frac{1}{s_{vg}}$ and mean θ_{vg} , where $s_{vg} > 0$ is small enough to ensure interior solutions for vote shares. A member of group g with L-loyalty $\tilde{\theta}$ will vote for L if

$$\tilde{\theta} + \sum_k \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^L > (1 - \alpha) \sum_k \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^T \quad (1)$$

In the period t election, the L party’s resulting vote share among village v residents will be

$$\sigma_v^p = \bar{\theta}_v + \sum_g \mu_{vg} s_{vg} \sum_k \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^L - (1 - \alpha) \sum_g \mu_{vg} s_{vg} \sum_k \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^T \quad (2)$$

where $\bar{\theta}_v \equiv \frac{1}{2} + \sum_g \mu_{vg} \theta_{vg}$ represents the mean popularity of party L in village v .

4.2 Voting under Clientelism

Now consider the implications of clientelism, based on the formulation in [Bardhan and Mookherjee \(2018\)](#). Here, the incumbent party can withhold the distribution of private benefits to residents who did not vote for it in the previous election. The descriptive literature on clientelism describes many ways that secret ballots can be circumvented and party officials can monitor how each citizen votes.⁸

In such a setting, voting decisions additionally incorporate strategic considerations — if they vote for the party that ends up losing the election they will be punished by the winner and lose their access to private benefits. Each resident will compare expected utility of voting for either party, incorporating beliefs regarding the winner of the election (denoted by p_L , the probability that L wins). Suppose that party L is the incumbent (the exact expressions below will be modified in a straightforward manner if it is challenger). The expected utility of a member of group g with preference $\tilde{\theta}$ for the L party in period $(t + 1)$ upon voting for L is

⁸Even if such methods are not possible, residents’ votes can be inferred from their expressions of public support (e.g., attendance in party rallies) on the eve of the election. Party operatives need only monitor attendance in these rallies, and condition allocation of private benefits on attendance (e.g., provide the benefit only if the resident attended the rally organized by the party that won the last election, and did not attend the pre-election rally of the opponent party). Residents attending the rally of a party then have an incentive to vote for it.

$$\tilde{\theta} + p_L \sum_{k \in \mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{P}} \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^L + (1 - \alpha)(1 - p_L) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{P}} \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^T \quad (3)$$

since if it wins, T will withhold distribution of private benefits to this household in the next period. Conversely, the household will obtain an expected utility of

$$p_L \sum_{k \in \mathcal{P}} \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^L + (1 - \alpha)(1 - p_L) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{R}} \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}^T \quad (4)$$

if it votes instead for T. Comparing (3) with (4), we see that the resident will vote for L if

$$\tilde{\theta} + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{R}} \beta_{kg} [p_L \pi_{kg}^L - (1 - \alpha)(1 - p_L) \pi_{kg}^T] > 0 \quad (5)$$

Therefore, *public goods distributed by either party no longer matter*: voting decisions depend only on a comparison of private benefits distributed by either party, weighted by their respective likelihoods of winning.

This generates a fundamental difference between programmatic politics and clientelism: in the latter, voters weigh the expected personal consequences of their voting decisions. If the candidate they vote for loses the election, they will be punished by the subsequent incumbent. This punishment consists of the denial of private benefits earmarked for their group. By the very nature of public goods, they cannot be excluded from what will be provided by the incumbent. Hence, only private transfers matter, not public goods. Voting no longer reflects citizens' comparative evaluation of the policies of competing candidates.

The resulting vote share of L in the village is

$$\sigma_v^c = \bar{\theta}_v + \sum_g \mu_{vg} s_{vg} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{R}} \beta_{kg} [p_L \pi_{kg}^L - (1 - \alpha)(1 - p_L) \pi_{kg}^T] \quad (6)$$

4.3 Second Stage GP (Within-Village) Allocations

Elected officials controlling the GP allocate private benefits in period t to maximize the vote share of their own party in the next election. Expressions (2) and (6) show that under both programmatic politics and clientelism, for any given private program k , officials in either party have a dominant strategy $\{\pi_{kg}^*\}$, which maximizes $\sum_g \mu_{vg} s_{vg} \beta_{kg} \pi_{kg}$ subject to $\sum_g \mu_g \pi_{kg} = B_{kv}$. Hence, private benefit distribution policies of GP incumbents will be the same under programmatic politics and clientelism (i.e, in the latter among those that vote in favor of the incumbent).⁹ From these conditions, we can characterize within-village alloca-

⁹However, in clientelism private benefits are denied to those who voted for the losing party, resulting in a budgetary surplus. This could potentially be used to provide more benefits to those that voted for the incumbent. We avoid this complication by assuming that benefits denied to those voting for the losing party are diverted

tions and the resulting vote shares in the next election.

Consider any GP with village v that receives a budget B_{kv} for program $k \in \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{R}$. Under either programmatic politics or clientelism, private benefit k will be allocated within the village by a GP as follows. Groups will be ranked in order of priority according to the distributional characteristic $\delta_{vg} \equiv s_{vg}\beta_{kg}$. Define g^* as follows: it is the group g with the lowest value δ_{vg} , such that $B_{kv} \geq \sum_{\{g': \delta_{vg'} \geq \delta_{vg}\}} \mu_{vg'}$. Then π_{kg} equals one for all groups g with $\delta_{vg} > \delta_{vg^*}$ and zero for all groups with $\delta_{vg} < \delta_{vg^*}$, with $\pi_{kg^*} = \frac{B_{kv} - \sum_{\{g': \delta_{vg'} \geq \delta_{vg^*}\}} \mu_{vg'}}{\sum_{\{g: \delta_{vg} = \delta_{vg^*}\}} \mu_{vg}}$. The resulting vote share of the L party in programmatic politics will be

$$\sigma_v = \bar{\theta}_v + I_v \alpha \sum_{k \in \mathcal{R}} \left[\sum_{\{g: \delta_{vg} > \delta_{vg^*}\}} \mu_{vg} (\delta_{vg} - \delta_{vg^*}) + \delta_{vg^*} B_{kv} \right] + I_v \alpha \sum_{k \in \mathcal{P}} \left(\sum_g \mu_{vg} \delta_{vg} \right) B_{kv} \quad (7)$$

and will thus respond both to private and public benefits allocated to the village. Under clientelism, the share will be

$$\sigma_v = \bar{\theta}_v + I_v [(2 - \alpha)p - (1 - \alpha)] \sum_{k \in \mathcal{R}} \left[\sum_{\{g: \delta_{vg} > \delta_{vg^*}\}} \mu_{vg} (\delta_{vg} - \delta_{vg^*}) + \delta_{vg^*} B_{kv} \right] \quad (8)$$

where $I_v = 1$ or -1 depending on whether the GP is controlled by the L or T party, respectively; and p denotes voter beliefs that the current incumbent will be re-elected. Votes will respond only to the private benefits allocated.

The within-village allocation of a private benefit program k will thus be as follows. Different voter groups will be ordered by their “swing-weighted” benefit $\delta_{vg} = s_{vg}\beta_{kg}$; the GP will allocate the benefit to groups with the highest priority until the budget is exhausted. Define $\nu_{kv} \equiv \frac{\partial \sigma_v}{\partial B_{kv}}$, the marginal vote-generating effectiveness of benefit k in village v . In both programmatic politics and clientelism, ν_{kv} is proportional to $I_v \delta_{vg^*}$, positive for the incumbent and negative for the challenger. In programmatic politics, the factor of proportionality is α the incumbency advantage parameter; in clientelism, it is $[(2 - \alpha)p - (1 - \alpha)]$, which depends on voter beliefs that the incumbent will be re-elected.¹⁰

for personal use by party members, or disposed of. This simplifies the model without changing any of the qualitative conclusions that follow.

¹⁰These expressions would be modified when private benefits are of a one-time nature rather than recurring. ν_{kv} will be smaller compared with recurring private benefits because households that have already received a one-time benefit are not eligible to receive it again. Hence, current distributions will not motivate current or past recipients. Only those who are yet to receive the benefit will be motivated by the likelihood of receiving it in the future, which they gauge by observing current distribution patterns. The marginal utility β_{kg} will thus be weighted by the fraction of members of group g who are yet to receive it. This adjustment will lower the distributional characteristic of a one-time benefit relative to a recurring benefit for any group. Hence one

The key distinction between programmatic politics and clientelism is thus the effect of public benefits on voter support. ν_{kv} is positive under programmatic politics and zero in clientelism. In addition, the vote-generating effectiveness of private benefits depends on the incumbency parameter α in programmatic politics and on voter beliefs p that the incumbent will be re-elected in clientelism.

4.4 First-Stage PS (Across-Village) Benefit Allocations

Now consider the decisions made by the government controlling C_i , given the budget allotment B_{ki} that it has received from the government one tier above. The vote share of party L in C_i is $\sigma_i \equiv \sum_{v \in C_i} n_v \sigma_v$. Anticipated village vote shares σ_v depends in turn on benefit program budgets B_{kv} allocated to the corresponding GPs, as described in (7) and (8).

As in standard models of probabilistic voting, we assume the probability that the party L candidate wins constituency C_i equals $p(\sigma_i)$, a smooth monotone increasing function of its aggregate vote share. The function p smooths the likelihood of winning, owing to possible randomness in turnout or vote-counting errors.

The party controlling C_i is the party that controls the corresponding PS. Let $I_i = 1, -1$, depending on whether C_i is controlled at t by the L or the T party. The incumbent party selects an inter-village allocation $B_{kv}, k = 1, \dots, K$ to maximize

$$I_i R p\left(\sum_{v \in C_i} n_v \sigma_v\right) - \frac{d}{2} \sum_{v \in C_i} \sum_k n_v (B_{kv} - B_{ki})^2 \quad (9)$$

subject to village-level vote-share equations (7) or (8) under programmatic politics and clientelism, respectively, and the budget constraint $\sum_{v \in C_i} n_v B_{kv} = B_{ki}, k = 1, \dots, K$. R denotes exogenous political rents of office, and B_{ki} is the budget the PS receives from the next-highest tier at the district level. The first term in (9) represents the objective of enhancing re-election prospects, which motivates the incumbent party to bias inter-village allocations in favor of villages where benefit programs are likely to generate most votes for the C_i incumbent. Budget distortions impose a cost proportional to the variance of the resulting inter-village allocation, represented by the second term in (9).¹¹ The parameter d is assumed to be large enough to ensure that the objective function (9) is concave over the relevant range of vote shares, so that

time private benefits will generate a smaller vote share response compared to a recurring private benefit. The adjustment would apply equally in both programmatic politics and clientelism.

¹¹This represents the cost of coping with complaints of unfair treatment from village-level representativeness, media watchdogs, or auditors appointed by upper-level governments.

optimal allocations are characterized by interior first-order conditions.¹²

The first-order conditions for this maximization problem provide the following characterization of the optimal inter-village allocation.

Proposition 1. *The optimal inter-village allocation of program k across GPs located in constituency C_i satisfies*

$$B_{kv}^* = B_{ki} + \frac{R}{d} p'_i(\sigma_i^*) [\nu_{kv} I_v I_i - \sum_{v'} n_{v'} \nu_{kv'} I_i I_{v'}] \quad (10)$$

where B_{ki} denotes the per capita budget for the constituency, and σ_i^* denotes the resulting equilibrium vote share of the L party.

The inter-village allocation of benefit k within constituency C_i is biased in favor of village v by an extent that depends on the following factors: (a) ν_{kv} : how effective the benefit is in generating votes; (b) p'_i : how competitive the constituency is; and (c) $I_v I_i = 1$ or -1 : whether political control is aligned between the two tiers. This yields the following corollary.

Corollary 1. *(a) In clientelism (resp. programmatic politics), public benefits will not (resp. will) respond to shocks in political competitiveness.*

(b) For private benefits under either programmatic politics or clientelism, aligned GPs (where $I_i I_v = 1$) will receive higher (per capita) budgets than their non-aligned counterparts (where $I_i I_v = -1$). Non-aligned GPs will receive less in more competitive constituencies, while aligned ones will receive more. The opposite will be the case if the GP is redistricted to a less competitive constituency.

Hence, alignment and competitiveness determine the direction and extent of the budgetary manipulation by the upper-tier government, as illustrated in the Figure 5. We obtain the following testable predictions concerning the effects of redistricting: (1) Redistricting to a more competitive constituency will result in a larger (smaller) program scale in aligned (non-aligned) redistricted GPs, compared to non-redistricted GPs, thus resulting in a larger gap between the aligned and non-aligned GPs in this group. (2) Within aligned GPs, those redistricted to more competitive constituencies will receive larger allocations than those redistricted to less competitive ones. The opposite will be the case for non-aligned GPs. Finally, in programmatic politics these patterns will appear for both public and private programs, whereas in clientelism they will appear only for private benefit programs.

¹²We need d bigger than $R p''(\sigma_i^*) (n_v I_v \nu_k)^2$ for all v, k holds at the equilibrium vote share σ_i^* .

Figure 5: Theoretical Predictions

Note. This figure outlines the main predictions of our model. Redistricting to a more competitive constituency will result in a larger (smaller) program scale in aligned (non-aligned) redistricted GPs, compared to non-redistricted GPs, thus resulting in a larger gap between the aligned and non-aligned GPs in this group. Within aligned GPs, those redistricted to more competitive constituencies will receive larger allocations than those redistricted to less competitive ones. The opposite will be the case for non-aligned GPs. In program politics these patterns will appear for both public and private programs, whereas in clientelism they will appear only for private benefit programs.

5 Empirical Results

5.1 Effects of Redistricting on Inter-Village Benefit Allocations

In this section, we empirically test the predictions of our model and make inferences about the prevalence of clientelism vis-a-vis programmatic politics. We use difference-in-differences analysis with time period 2004-2006 as the pre-redistricting years, and 2007-2008 as the post redistricting years. Since our treatment groups are defined partly by alignment of political control at the GP and PS levels, we restrict attention in this section to the years 2004-2008 since alignment did not change during this period.¹³

Our empirical strategy is illustrated in Figure 6. GPs are represented by black dots. The brown and black solid contours respectively define the old and new boundaries between different assembly constituencies C1 and C2. Some GPs continue to remain in the same constituency (control group), while some (such as the black dot with a red circle around it) are reassigned from C2 to C1. If C1 is a more contested constituency, changes in vote share in the redistricted GP will matter more in determining the winner of the subsequent assembly

¹³Recall that local government elections were held in 2003 and 2008.

election.¹⁴

Figure 6: Illustrating Redistricting of Gram Panchayats

Note. This figure illustrates redistricting of gram panchayats (GPs) in our sample. GPs are represented by black dots. The brown and black solid contours respectively define the old and new boundaries between different assembly constituencies C1 and C2. Some GPs continue to remain in the same constituency (control group), while some (such as the black dot with a brown circle around it) were "moved" from C2 to C1.

The party controlling the PS will therefore manipulate the budgetary allocation to the redistricted GP in a direction depending on political alignment. If the GP is controlled by the rival (resp. same) party, the PS will reduce (resp. increase) the allocation. This applies only for benefit programs with a significant positive effect on voting patterns. Hence, we can infer which benefit programs are expected to affect votes, by observing which ones are manipulated in the predicted directions.¹⁵

Table 4 provides linear probability regressions of the likelihood that any given village belonged to either the control group or one of the four treatment groups of redistricted villages (defined by alignment and competitiveness). Besides a range of village characteristics representing distribution of landownership, occupation, caste, religion and immigration, the remaining regressors reflect possible political motives of incumbents to manipulate the process: party controlling the PS, GP; whether Left party won Assembly seat in 2006 elections;

¹⁴This is based on the assumption that the redistricting itself does not alter the anticipated competitiveness of C1 and C2 in the subsequent election, or that even if it does the relative ordering of their expected competitiveness remains unchanged. This assumption is reasonable since the majority of GPs are not redistricted.

¹⁵We could potentially restrict our sample to only those villages that were close to the old boundary of the Assembly constituencies. These villages would have a higher likelihood of being redistricted than villages that were located in the center of the constituency. This would bring the empirical strategy closer to the ideal experiment, such that the villages that do get redistricted would have been picked "more randomly". Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to carry out such an exercise.

whether it was represented by an MP or MLA with a seat in the Delimitation Commissions; and whether the assembly constituency seat was reserved for Scheduled Caste (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST) candidates. [Iyer and Reddy \(2013\)](#) found that the last two regressors helped predict the likelihood of redistricting in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. In contrast, for our sample in West Bengal, Table 4 shows that none of these variables are significant predictors of the likelihood of belonging to any of the treatment groups.

Table 4: Predicting Redistricting

Dependent variable: Probability that village belongs to group i .					
Group i :	Not	HC Red. $\times$	HC Red. $\times$	LC Red. $\times$	LC Red. $\times$
	Redistricted	Aligned	Non-Aligned	Aligned	Non-Aligned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Left Panchayat Samiti	0.35 (0.22)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.21 (0.18)	-0.24 (0.18)
Left Dominated GP	-0.01 (0.11)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.10)
Left Won 2006 Assembly	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)
Delimitation Commission Member	-0.16 (0.11)	0.16 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.05)
Seat Reserved for SC/ST	-0.04 (0.16)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.02)
Proportion of HH Immigrated to Village Before 2004	-0.04 (0.34)	-0.24 (0.17)	0.03 (0.12)	0.03 (0.16)	0.22 (0.13)
Proportion of SC/ST HHs	0.42 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.14)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.08)
Proportion of Hindu HHs	-0.18 (0.14)	0.16 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.21 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.09)
Proportion Cultivators	-0.10 (0.31)	0.10 (0.19)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.16 (0.13)
Proportion Landless in 2004	0.08 (0.31)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.16)	0.14 (0.16)
Observations	89	89	89	89	89
Adjusted R^2	0.029	-0.015	0.087	0.032	0.196
Mean Dependent Variable	0.71	0.12	0.02	0.10	0.04

Note. This table shows regressions for the likelihood that any given village belonged to the control group or to one of the four treatment groups of redistricted villages (defined by alignment and competitiveness effect). *HC Redistricted* refers to those cases where the village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with a smaller gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *LC Redistricted* refers to those cases where a village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with an equal or a larger gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *Aligned* is a dummy that takes value 1 if the same party is in power at the GP as well as at Panchayat Samiti. *Seat Reserved for SC/ST* refers to Assembly constituency seats. *Left Won 2006 Assembly* takes value 1 if the Assembly constituency the village belongs to was won by Left Front in 2006. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at *panchayat samiti* level.

We now explain how we measure benefit allocations at the village-year level. Since the theory predicting GP-level allocations chosen by the PS authorities, in the case of public benefits the relevant measure is whether a road or irrigation project was undertaken in a given village in a given year. For this we rely only on household reports, implying that actual allocations will have to be proxied based on these reports. If even a single household from village v reported benefiting from a public project in year t , we infer that the project was approved and completed that year. This seems reasonable since most road projects constructed within a village are completed within a few months.¹⁶ If no household reported benefitting from a public project, we assume no project was approved for that year. We refer to this variable as the ‘imputed benefits’ for public goods. We shall check the robustness of our results to an alternative way of measuring public benefits, equal to the actual proportion of village households who reported benefitting from it in any given year. In the case of private benefits, we measure the village allocation as the per capita benefits distributed in the village in any given year. We shall also explore robustness to measuring it instead by the proportion of households in the village who reported receiving at least one private benefit of the stipulated kind in any given year.

Next we describe the regression specification. Villages redistricted to more (resp. less) competitive constituencies (smaller victory margins) are referred to as HCR (resp. LCR) villages. Let B_{vt} denote the benefit variable described above (measured in standard deviation units) for village v in year t . In the simpler specification we focus only on HCR (and its interaction with alignment) as the treatment variable:

$$B_{vt} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 P_t * HCR_v * A_v + \alpha_2 P_t * HCR_v + \beta X_{vt} + F_v + \tau_t + \epsilon_{vt} \quad (11)$$

where HCR_v is a dummy for (HCR) villages, A_v is a dummy for ‘Aligned’, i.e., control by the same party at both the PS and GP levels, and P_t is a dummy for post-2007 years. X_{vt} includes each of these three variables and pairwise interactions, and dummies for representation on the delimitation commission by the MLA or MP of the original constituency. F_v and τ_t are village and year fixed effects respectively. ϵ_{vt} is the error term; standard errors are clustered at the PS level. The theory predicts $\alpha_1 > 0$, $\alpha_2 < 0$, $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 > 0$ for any benefit program which

¹⁶We use administrative data for road projects from the MPLAD program to get an estimate of the time taken to construct village road projects comparable to the ones we examine in our analysis. There are 26 MPLAD projects in West Bengal between 2004 and 2008 for which we have data for time taken to complete from the day the project was approved. Only one road project took more than 360 days to complete. On average, the projects were completed in 154 days and the standard deviation was 85 days.

affects household votes positively, and all zero for benefits that do not affect voting patterns.

The full specification involves four different treatment groups, involving both HCR and LCR:

$$\begin{aligned}
B_{vt} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 P_t * HCR_v * A_v + \alpha_2 P_t * HCR_v + \alpha_3 P_t * LCR_v * A_v + \alpha_4 P_t * LCR_v \\
& + \beta X_{vt} + F_v + \tau_t + \epsilon_{vt}
\end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

where LCR_v denotes a dummy for an LCR village. Here the control group comprises non-redistricted villages. The theoretical predictions now are $\alpha_1 > 0 > \alpha_2$, $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 > 0$, $\alpha_3 < 0$, $\alpha_4 > 0$, $\alpha_3 + \alpha_4 < 0$ for programs that affect votes, and all zero otherwise.

Prior to reviewing the results of these regressions, Figure 7 shows the corresponding ‘event study’ results for each of the treatments separately and its corresponding interaction effect with different years, both before and after the year of redistricting, relative to 2006, the year of redistricting.

The dependent variable in each graph is the (deviation from the 2006 level) of the standardized measure of either aggregate private or public benefits at the village-year level. In all cases there do not appear to be any significant differences in pre-redistricting trends between aligned and non-aligned GPs. For the high-competition-nonaligned treatment we see a statistically significant negative post-redistricting coefficient for private benefits for each of the four years following 2006, resulting in a post-redistricting decline in sharp contrast to a (possibly slightly upward) pre-redistricting trend. This decline is also strikingly different from the positive impacts on high-competition-aligned GPs for the first three years following redistricting, and absence of any clear trend over 2006-2011 as a whole. As a consequence the difference between aligned and non-aligned HC constituencies is significantly negative for each year after 2006, but not in any year prior to 2006. For the other private benefit treatments the signs of the post-redistricting coefficients in each year are in line with the theoretical predictions, though they are statistically insignificant. In the case of public benefits, none of the post-redistricting years display any significant impacts.

Relative to the event study, our main regression specification (12) collapses the different year-interaction effects post and pre-redistricting into an average difference between post and pre-redistricting years, beside incorporating multiple treatments in the same regression. Our main regression covers the period 2004-08, in order to ensure balance between pre and post-redistricting phases, besides ensuring that political alignment remained the same before and

Figure 7: Event Study

Panel [a] Private Benefits

Panel [b] Public Benefits

Note. These figures plot the estimated treatment effects from the event study regressions with dependent variable being standardized annual per household benefits. Each of the eight graphs plot estimates from separate regressions. *Private benefits* include MNREGA, MPLAD, IRDP credits, agricultural minikits, ration cards, houses, toilets, and drinking water. *Public benefits* refer to roads and irrigation projects that households reported benefiting from. The per household road benefits are imputed from survey responses using the following procedure: if even a single household reports receiving benefits from roads, that village is considered to have had a road built for that year. *Aligned* means that the same party is in power at both the *panchayat samiti* and *gram panchayat* levels. *HC Redistricted* refers to those cases where the village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with a smaller gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *LC Redistricted* refers to those cases where a village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with an equal or a larger gap in vote share between winner and runner up. The treatment effect is normalized to be zero for 2006.

after.¹⁷ The results for the 2004-08 period are shown in Table 5.

For private and public benefits, columns 1 and 2 first show results when we combine the two treatment groups into a single treatment group, comprising GPs redistricted to more com-

¹⁷Appendix Table A9 shows similar results obtain when the post-redistricting period is extended to 2011.

Table 5: Effect of Competition and Alignment on Benefits Distributed

	Effect of High Competition		Effect of Alignment (Given Competition)		Effect of Alignment (HCR and LCR Villages)	
	Private (1)	Public (2)	Private (3)	Public (4)	Private (5)	Public (6)
Post $\times$ HC Redistricted	0.52 (0.64)	0.02 (0.32)	-1.75 (0.56)	-0.00 (0.13)	-1.19 (0.30)	-0.00 (0.18)
Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned			2.68 (0.83)	0.02 (0.40)	2.09 (0.69)	0.07 (0.42)
Post $\times$ LC Redistricted					1.98 (1.59)	-0.00 (0.18)
Post $\times$ LC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned					-2.16 (1.58)	0.29 (0.37)
Observations	445	445	445	445	445	445
Adjusted R^2	0.056	0.183	0.070	0.180	0.083	0.178
Test: (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned) + (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted) = 0						
F Statistic			2.17	0.00	1.96	0.03
P-value			(0.14)	(0.95)	(0.17)	(0.87)
Effect of Competition (Given Alignment)						
F-test for (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned) = (Post $\times$ LC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned)						
F-Statistic					6.62	0.23
p-value					(0.01)	(0.63)
F-test for (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted) = (Post $\times$ LC Redistricted)						
F-Statistic					4.04	0.00
p-value					(0.05)	(1.00)

Note. This table presents estimates for equations 11 and 12 of section 5.1. Observations are at the village-year level, 2004-2008. Post takes value 1 for years 2007 and onwards. The dependent variable is standardized measure of annual per-HH benefits for each village. *HC Redistricted* refers to those cases where the village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with a smaller gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *LC Redistricted* refers to those cases where a village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with an equal or a larger gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *PS* refers to *panchayat samiti*, and *Aligned* means same party is in power at both the PS and GP levels. *Private benefits* include panchayat-provided employment, MNREGA, MPLAD, IRDP credits, agricultural minikits, ration cards, houses, toilets, and drinking water. *Public benefits* refer to roads and irrigation. The per household road/irrigation benefits are imputed from survey responses using the following procedure: if even a single household reports receiving benefits from roads/irrigation, that village is considered to have had a road/irrigation project built for that year. All specifications include other interaction terms, whether MLA/MP was part of delimitation committee, village and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at *panchayat samiti* level. The standardized mean (std. dev.) is 0.75 (0.13) for per household private benefits and 0.26 (0.30) for imputed public goods.

petitive constituencies irrespective of alignment. We see no significant differences between the combined treatment group and the control group. Columns 3 and 4 then show results for the specification dictated by the theory, focusing only on the HCR treatment. Consistent with the model predictions, the difference in private benefit allocation between the aligned and non-aligned treatment groups relative to the control group increased significantly (by 2.68 s.d). For the GPs in the non-aligned (resp. aligned) treatment group, the program scales contracted (resp. expanded) by 1.75 (resp. 0.93) s.d. which was statistically significant (resp. insignificant) at the 1% level. For public benefits on the other hand, the results are consistent only with the clientelism model: the differential effects are negligible (within ± 0.02 s.d.) and statistically insignificant at the 10% level. The difference in statistical significance cannot be attributed to greater imprecision of the public benefit estimates, as their coefficients have lower standard errors.

The last two columns of Table 5 show results for the more demanding specification (equation 12) involving both HCR and LCR. For public benefits (column 6) none of the treatment effects are significant. For private benefits (column 5) and HC redistricted villages we continue to see the same results as before ($\alpha_1 > 0, \alpha_2 < 0, \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 > 0$). For the LC redistricted villages, the estimated coefficients are consistent with the model's predictions ($\alpha_3 < 0, \alpha_4 > 0, \alpha_3 + \alpha_4 < 0$) but statistically insignificant. However, the bottom panel of the table shows that within the aligned as well as within the non-aligned groups, the predicted effects are statistically significant: the LCR-aligned effect is smaller than the HCR-aligned effect ($\alpha_4 - \alpha_2 > 0$, p-value = .01), and the LCR-nonaligned effect is larger than the HCR-nonaligned effect ($(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2) - (\alpha_3 + \alpha_4) > 0$, p-value=.05).

Robustness Checks. In the Appendix, Table A4 shows that the preceding results are robust to inclusion of pre-2007 trends specific to each treatment group and the control group separately. Appendix Table A9 shows robustness when the post-redistricting period is extended to 2011, to allay concerns regarding possible time lags between approval and completion of road projects.

The preceding results aggregated different types of private benefits into a single category of benefits, which may raise concerns about aggregation biases and interpretation. Table 6 shows the corresponding results for employment programs (columns 1 and 2), which are similar to those for aggregate private benefits. These results are not confined to employment programs alone: columns 3 and 4 provide corresponding regressions for all private benefits excluding employment programs. Columns 5 and 6 show that the absence of significant effects on the allocation of public benefits continues to hold when they include drinking water

Table 6: Robustness: Effect of Competition and Alignment

	Employment		Private Benefits Without Employment		Public Benefits With Water	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned	2.67 (0.83)	2.28 (0.77)	2.08 (0.86)	1.68 (0.77)	0.19 (0.42)	0.18 (0.43)
Post $\times$ HC Redistricted	-2.22 (0.76)	-1.83 (0.67)	-1.09 (0.52)	-0.69 (0.34)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.19)
Post $\times$ LC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned		-1.38 (1.17)		-1.45 (1.52)		0.08 (0.47)
Post $\times$ LC Redistricted		1.36 (1.22)		1.39 (1.44)		0.19 (0.29)
Observations	445	445	445	445	445	445
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.038	0.059	0.062	0.199	0.197
Test: (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned) + (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted) = 0						
F Statistic	1.64	1.36	2.08	2.02	0.12	0.20
P-value	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.73)	(0.67)
Effect of Competition (Given Alignment)						
F-test for (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned) = (Post $\times$ LC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned)						
F-Statistic		7.81		3.61		0.03
p-value		(0.01)		(0.06)		(0.86)
F-test for (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted) = (Post $\times$ LC Redistricted)						
F-Statistic		5.44		2.09		0.87
p-value		(0.02)		(0.16)		(0.36)

Note. This table estimates the same regression specifications as Table 5, but with alternative definitions of private and public goods. The dependent variable is standardized measure of annual per-HH benefits for each village. Observations are at the village-year level, 2004-2008. Post takes value 1 for years 2007 and onwards. *HC Redistricted* refers to those cases where the village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with a smaller gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *LC Redistricted* refers to those cases where a village was redistricted to an assembly constituency with an equal or a larger gap in vote share between winner and runner up. *PS* refers to *panchayat samiti*, and *Aligned* means same party is in power at both the PS and GP levels. *Employment* consists of panchayat-provided employment, MNREGA and MPLAD employment. *Water* refers to drinking water. *Private benefits without employment* include IRDP credits, agricultural minikits, ration cards, houses, toilets, and drinking water. *Public benefits with water* consists of roads, irrigation and drinking water. All specifications include other interaction terms, whether MLA/MP was part of delimitation committee, village and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at *panchayat samiti* level. The standardized mean (std. dev.) is 0.49 (0.10) for per household employment benefits, 0.53 (0.09) for per household private benefits without employment, and 0.28 (0.32) for imputed public good benefits with water.

access. Appendix Table A6 shows more detailed results for each type of benefit separately.

Table 7, columns 3 and 4, present results from a placebo test using data for the period 2004 - 2006, with the redistricting date hypothetically moved ahead by one year to the end of 2005 (so 2006 constitutes a post-redistricting year, while 2004 and 2005 are prior years). These are contrasted with the ‘correct’ specification in columns 1 and 2, restricted also to a three year window (2005-07) around the actual year of redistricting (end of 2006, so 2007 is a post-redistricting year while 2005 and 2006 constituted prior years). While results similar to previous tables reappear in the correct specification, they fail to do so in the placebo columns. Columns 5 and 6 present results for a specification with placebo treatment groups. These groups are constructed as follows: we take the sub-sample of villages that were not redistricted in 2006. For all these villages, there was no change in competition at the *panchayat samiti* level in the period 2004-2008. We then randomly assign a subset of villages into ‘Placebo HCR’ group and a subset of villages in ‘Placebo LCR’ group. The post period is 2007 onwards. The results show that there is no effect of placebo treatment groups on private and public benefits allocations.

The outcome variable used so far was standardized measure of annual per-HH benefits for each village. We also estimate equations 11 and 12 with an alternative dependent variable: the proportion of households receiving at least one benefit annually for each village. Appendix Table A5 shows the qualitative results are unaffected by (a) measuring private benefits by the proportion of households reporting receipt of at least one benefit, and (b) measuring public benefits by the actual proportion of households that report having benefitted from a public program. Appendix Table A7 shows that the results of placebo regression exercises similar to ones in Table 7. The results remain the same.

In summary, the results confirm the predictions of the clientelistic model: we see large effects on the program scales of private benefits and negligible insignificant effects for public benefits; these results appear only after redistricting occurs. The short time span studied allows us to focus only on short run effects of the redistricting. This is not a problem for various reasons. We are not interested in the effects of redistricting *per se*, and use it only as a source of exogenous shock to political competition to infer the underlying mechanisms of how benefits of different kinds affect voting, and how allocation of benefits are manipulated by upper tiers of the government in response. Moreover, we do not expect any long lasting effects, since alignment patterns changed after the 2008 panchayat elections. Political competition changed in the wake of the 2009 parliamentary election and then again even more decisively in the 2011 state assembly election.

Table 7: Placebo Tests

	Main Specification (<i>pre</i> : 2005-2006) (<i>post</i> : 2007)		Placebo Shock (<i>pre</i> : 2004-2005) (<i>post</i> : 2006)		Placebo Treatment (<i>pre</i> : 2004-2006) (<i>post</i> : 2007-2008)	
	Private (1)	Public (2)	Private (3)	Public (4)	Private (5)	Public (6)
Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned	2.75 (0.79)	-0.63 (0.40)	-0.54 (0.88)	0.74 (0.91)	0.20 (1.14)	0.41 (0.80)
Post $\times$ LC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned	-1.17 (1.35)	-0.16 (0.53)	0.03 (0.99)	0.80 (0.92)	-0.15 (1.31)	-0.59 (0.58)
Post $\times$ HC Redistricted	-1.77 (0.46)	0.21 (0.14)	0.28 (0.76)	-0.50 (0.81)	-0.69 (1.08)	-0.71 (0.77)
Post $\times$ LC Redistricted	1.29 (1.16)	0.21 (0.14)	-0.74 (0.91)	-0.50 (0.81)	-0.91 (1.12)	-0.16 (0.41)
Observations	267	267	267	267	380	380
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.122	0.086	0.131	0.079	0.216
F-test for (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned) = (Post $\times$ LC Redistricted $\times$ Aligned)						
F-Statistic	8.81	0.87	0.57	0.01	0.40	2.88
p-value	(0.00)	(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.90)	(0.53)	(0.10)
F-test for (Post $\times$ HC Redistricted) = (Post $\times$ LC Redistricted)						
F-Statistic	7.86	0.00	2.40	0.00	0.44	1.52
p-value	(0.01)	(1.00)	(0.13)	(1.00)	(0.51)	(0.22)

Note. This table provides two types of placebo tests for the main difference-in-differences specification. The first is the *Placebo Shock* test (columns 3-4) which uses data for the pre-redistricting period 2004 - 2006 and hypothetically moves the redistricting date ahead by one year (end of 2005). Post takes value 1 for 2006. *Redistricted* refers to cases where the GP was redistricted to an assembly constituency where the incumbent party has a lower likelihood of winning based on victory margins. The second is the *Placebo Treatment* test (columns 5-6) which creates placebo treatment groups (constructed randomly) using the sub-sample of villages that were not redistricted in 2006. The time period is 2004-2008. Post takes value 1 for years 2007 and onwards. For both tests, the dependent variable is standardized measure of annual per-HH benefits for each village. Observations are at the village-year level. *PS* refers to *panchayat samiti*, and *Aligned* means same party is in power at both the PS and GP levels. *Private benefits* include panchayat-provided employment, MNREGA, MPLAD, IRDP credits, agricultural minikits, ration cards, houses, toilets, and drinking water. *Public benefits* refer to roads and irrigation. The per household road benefits are imputed from survey responses using the following procedure: if even a single household reports receiving benefits from roads, that village is considered to have had a road built for that year. All specifications include other interaction terms, whether MLA/MP was part of delimitation committee, village and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at *panchayat samiti* level.

5.2 Household-Level Analysis: Effects of Benefits on Political Support

We now turn to estimate the effects of benefits on political support at the household level. Since there was no survey conducted during the Panchayat term 2004-2008, we do not have data on political support before the redistricting. We therefore examine cross-sectional differences in the likelihood of households expressing support for the GP incumbent in the 2011 household ballots. Column 1 of Table 8 reports OLS regression results for how the likelihood of the head of households voting for the incumbent party varied with number of private and public benefits their household received between 2009 and 2011. We restrict attention to benefits received during this period because the previous GP elections were held in 2008, so there is a single well-defined incumbent at the GP level after 2008. The regression specification is

$$L_{iv} = \sum_k \nu_k b_{kiv} + \beta X_{iv} + \alpha_{d(v)} + \epsilon_{iv} \quad (13)$$

where L_{iv} is a dummy for whether the incumbent party was supported by household head i in village v in the 2011 household ballot, b_{kiv} is a standardized measure of the number of benefits of type k reported by the household over the 2009 - 2011 period, X_{iv} is a vector of household and village controls¹⁸, and $\alpha_{d(v)}$ represents district fixed effects. Note in particular that the public benefits variable here is the actual report made by the household head, rather than an imputation based on reports made by other households in the same village in the corresponding year.

Column 1 of Table 8 shows a positive, significant OLS estimate of the effect of a one standard deviation increase in reported private benefits – a 2.4% effect, significant at the 5% level. The corresponding effect for public benefits is -1% and statistically insignificant.

To address possible sources of OLS bias such as omitted variables (less popular incumbents were motivated to provide more benefits) or reverse causality (benefits targeted to loyal supporters rather than swing voters), we now provide IV estimates, using a strategy similar to [Levitt and Snyder Jr \(1997\)](#) to generate an instrument for the supply at the village level (GP budget allocated by the PS), which is then interacted with fixed household characteristics to represent the intra-village allocation. To explain this instrument, we return to the budgeting

¹⁸Household characteristics include dummies for SC/ST, religion, landlessness, occupation, and whether the head of household is educated. All specifications include the following GP characteristics: dummies for Left Front control of GP, dummies for Left Front control of PS, and alignment between GP and PS control.

Table 8: Effect of Benefits on Votes for Incumbent in 2011

	OLS	IV Regression			OLS	IV Regression		
		First Stage		Second		First Stage		Second
	(1)	Private	Public	Stage	(5)	Private	Public	Stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Private Benefits	0.02 (0.01)			0.14 (0.06)	0.03 (0.02)			0.14 (0.06)
Public Benefits	-0.01 (0.02)			-0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.01)			-0.07 (0.04)
$S_{d(v)}$		-0.80 (0.10)	-0.94 (0.11)			-0.00 (0.05)	0.11 (0.08)	
$S_{d(v)} * \text{SC/ST}$		0.17 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.08)			0.16 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.08)	
$S_{d(v)} * \text{Landless}$		0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)			0.15 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.07)	
$S_{d(v)} * \text{No Educ.}$		0.16 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)			0.13 (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)	
$S_{d(v)} * \text{Hindu}$		-0.15 (0.07)	0.15 (0.10)			0.15 (0.06)	0.39 (0.09)	
Observations	2383	2402	2402	2383	2383	2402	2402	2383
Adjusted R^2	0.181	0.240	0.402	0.132	0.143	0.142	0.183	0.098
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
F-Test of excluded instruments (p-value)		17.56 (0.00)	6.02 (0.00)			22.53 (0.00)	27.01 (0.00)	
Rank Test (p-value)				15.85 (0.00)				26.27 (0.00)
Weak-Instrument-Robust Tests:								
Lagrange Multiplier test [†] (p-value)				6.54 (0.04)				6.10 (0.05)
J -Overidentification test [§] (p-value)				4.60 (0.20)				5.52 (0.14)

Note. This table presents OLS estimates for equation 13 and IV estimates for equation 16 in section 5.2. The dependent variable is whether respondent voted for the incumbent party in majority at the GP. *Private* and *public* benefits are standardized and aggregated over period 2009-2011. All specifications include household (HH) characteristics and GP characteristics. HH Characteristics include SC/ST, religion, landlessness, occupation, and level of education of household head. GP characteristics include dummy for left GP, dummy for left *panchayat samiti* (PS) and dummy for alignment between GP and PS. Endogenous variables: private and public benefits. Excluded instruments: standardized aggregate per capita total benefits ($S_{d(v)}$) and $S_{d(v)} \times \text{HH}$ characteristics. HH characteristics used for instruments are: SC/ST, landless, no education and religion dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at village level in (1). The mean proportion of households voting for incumbent party in majority at the GP is 0.52 and the standard deviation is 0.50.

equation (10), applied to a specific program in a given constituency or district:

$$B_v = \bar{B} + \theta_v - \sum_{v'} n_{v'} \theta_{v'} \quad (14)$$

where B_v denotes the per-household benefit allocated to village v , $\bar{B}$ the corresponding per-household benefit in the district, n_v is the population share of village v and θ_v is the ‘political deservingness’ of village v representing the product of ‘competitiveness’ $\frac{Rp'}{d}$, alignment $I_i I_v$ and ν_v the vote generating effectiveness of the program in village v . Since the political deservingness of a village is related to voting propensities of its residents, equation (14) shows the pattern of reverse causation that biases the OLS estimate of the effect of benefits on votes in regression (13).

Assuming that the political deservingness of different villages are drawn from an i.i.d. distribution conditional on a district-specific parameter, we can take a random sample I of *other* villages in the district. For any such village v' in I , the same budget equation (14) applies, hence

$$B_{v'} = \bar{B} + (1 - n_{v'})\theta_{v'} - n_v\theta_v - \sum_{v'' \neq v, v'} n_{v''}\theta_{v''} \quad (15)$$

As the population share of each village within the district goes to zero, equation (15) implies the cross-village correlation between $B_{v'}$ and θ_v goes to zero, while the correlation of $B_{v'}$ with its own deservingness $\theta_{v'}$ is bounded away from zero. Hence, for any given village v , the average per household benefit of other villages in the district helps predict $\sum_{v'} n_{v'}\theta_{v'}$, which in turn helps predict B_v (using (14)), making it an asymptotically valid instrument for B_v . Even if population shares of each village are not close to zero, they are typically less than $\frac{1}{2}$, so the bias in the IV estimator will be smaller than of the OLS estimator.¹⁹

Hence, we instrument program scale by program scales in other villages in the same district, interacted with dummies for fixed household characteristics H_{iv} such as caste, landlessness, education, and religion (significant determinants of within-GP targeting) to predict the delivery of benefits to individual households. The first-stage and second-stage regression specifications are as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{First Stage: } b_{ivk} &= \tau_1 S_{d(v)} * H_{iv} + \tau_2 S_{d(v)} + \tau_3 H_{iv} + \tau_4 X_{iv} + \theta_{d(v)} + \eta_{ivk} \\ \text{Second Stage: } L_{iv} &= \sum_k \nu_k \bar{b}_{ivk} + \rho_1 H_{iv} + \rho_2 X_v + \alpha_{d(v)} + \epsilon_{iv} \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

¹⁹The coefficient of θ_v in expression (15) for $B_{v'}$ equals n_v , whereas its coefficient in expression (14) for B_v equals $1 - n_v$.

where $\bar{b}_{ivk}$ denotes predicted benefits of type k received by the household, obtained from the first-stage regression, and $S_{d(v)}$ denotes per capita benefit across all sample villages in the same district level after excluding village v .

We show estimation results in Table 8. The first four columns present results corresponding to inclusion of district fixed effects as controls, while the last four shows the results when they are dropped. We show that the results are robust to including or dropping district fixed effects. This allays concerns with either of the alternate specification: if they are included, then by construction the leave-out instrument is correlated negatively with the allocation to the village in question. This may cause the exclusion restriction to be violated. On the other hand, if they are excluded, then effects of inter-district variation are incorporated, resulting in concerns with omission of relevant district-level unobservable variables.

The first stage regressions show the instruments are strong enough when district fixed effects are dropped, but otherwise are weak for public benefits. In both cases, the full rank test for identification is not rejected: hence the instruments provide enough independent variation in the two endogenous variables. For inference with weak instruments, we follow [Andrews et al. \(2019\)](#). The weak-instrument-robust Lagrange multiplier test statistic for joint significance of coefficients of the two endogenous variables is significant at the 5% level, irrespective of whether district fixed effects are included. The weak-instrument-robust Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid.

In either specification, the IV estimate for effect of private benefits on the likelihood of the household head voting for incumbent is 14%, much larger than the OLS estimate. Even if the IV is not unbiased, it is likely to be less biased than the OLS estimate, so the contrast between the OLS and IV estimate indicates the OLS bias is negative. This is consistent with the hypothesis that weaker incumbents provide more benefits, and with targeting of benefits to swing rather than loyal voters. In contrast, the effect of receipt of public benefits is negative and statistically insignificant. So the evidence in favor of clientelism continues to be upheld at the household level, and responsiveness of voters to private and public benefits mirrors the pattern of manipulation of GP budgets by upper tiers shown in the previous section.

6 Addressing Possible Concerns or Alternative Explanations

We now consider some possible concerns with our analysis, including alternative explanations which do not rely on prevalence of clientelism. One such possibility is that programmatic pol-

itics coexists with corruption, the scope for which is greater in public good programs (e.g., because citizens are less well-informed about the costs of building local infrastructure, while they know what to expect in terms of private benefits based on stated policy platforms). This implies that the composition of government expenditure is distorted in favor of public good programs. Competitive pressure and re-election motives would then induce politicians to re-allocate budgets in favor of private benefits in aligned constituencies. However, we should also expect to see significant reductions in supply of public benefits in such constituencies, contrary to the evidence. Moreover, under programmatic politics, citizen votes should respond positively to both private and public good benefits – a prediction which is contrary our results. Note that the hypothesis that households derive no utility from public goods can be discounted because many households actually reported benefitting from the public goods (while it did not affect the way they voted).

Consider next the possibility of measurement error in benefits, arising from potential recall bias of households owing to surveys being conducted retrospectively. Could the results of Table 8 be due to greater recall bias with respect to public benefits? On the face of it, this seems implausible in the West Bengal context, as most local road projects (which constitute the vast majority of public benefits) implemented by the local government are clearly marked with a permanent sign recording the date of construction the role of the GP (and the funding source) in building the road. Moreover, this explanation cannot account for the results in Table 8, where households that recalled benefitting from public goods did not respond with their political support in the same way as when they recalled benefitting from private goods. To further check the possibility of recall bias for road benefits, Table A1 in the Appendix checks the extent of within-village clustering of household responses to road benefits. It shows a very high within-village-year clustering of household responses of road benefits: in 81% of village-years, the proportion of household-pairs reporting the same benefit exceeded 95%.²⁰

A third possible explanation of our findings is that there are long gestation lags between approval and completion of road projects. In that case budget approvals in any given year would not translate into roads completed the same (or next one of two years). Since our results in Table 5 are based on aggregating household reports of benefits from (presumably completed) road projects in a single year, could it explain why this measure of public benefits does not react to contemporary shocks in electoral competition? We do not think so, for the following reasons. First, using administrative data for roads constructed under the MPLAD

²⁰In comparison, the same was true for private benefits in 45% of village years.

program in West Bengal, we find that from the day of approval, the average time taken to complete construction was 154 days and the standard deviation was 85 days. Hence, most village programs are completed well within one year. Second, it would not explain the results in Table 8 showing lack of responsiveness of household votes to receipt of benefits from a road project completed that year.

Another concern with our explanation could be the underlying assumption of nonexcludability of local public goods. If certain groups of residents could be prevented from using them, discretion could be used by political incumbents in the allocation of access based on voting patterns. While this may be partially true in the case of some public amenities (such as drinking water taps), we think it is less plausible in the case of roads since Appendix Table A1 shows a high degree of clustering of household responses concerning road benefits within any village-year. Moreover, it would also not explain the results of Table 8: why votes of household heads do not respond to the public goods they did report benefitting from, in the same way as they do for private benefits.

7 Conclusion

This paper shows that under clientelism, private benefits are effective in generating votes but public goods are not. The empirical evidence for this is provided in two different ways. One examines changes in allocation of local-government program benefits across villages as a result of exogenous shocks to political competition. The other studies how the political support expressed by individual heads of household responded to variations in benefits they received, instrumented by variations in average program scale at the district level. The results corroborate each other in a manner predicted by a theoretical model of politically manipulated budgets that reflects the way household votes respond to private versus public programs.

Identifying the patterns of resource allocation consistent with political clientelism is an important first step towards assessing its implications for development. Clientelism can potentially lead to three main distortions. First, since voters are less responsive to receiving benefits from infrastructure projects, there could be under-provision of public goods as a consequence of clientelism. Second, since inter-village allocation of benefits depends on political alignment across the tiers of governments, clientelism can result in increasing inequality in resource allocation *across* regions. Third, it is possible that the discretion allowed to local politicians could result in resources being diverted or misused for corrupt purposes. However, on the other hand, clientelism could possibly lead to better targeting of resources *within* lo-

cal jurisdictions. Local political brokers have better information about potential beneficiaries which can be exploited by elected officials for redistribution of private benefits or provision of insurance against shocks. If the distortions generated by clientelism are bigger than the gains from better targeting of resources, switching from discretionary allocation of programs benefits to rule-based allocation may be desirable.²¹ The potential gains of adopting such alternative policies, and more generally, welfare implications of clientelism is left for future work.

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²¹Faguet (2002), Faguet (2006) argue that the adoption of formula-based grants to local governments in the 1995 decentralization reform in Bolivia dramatically reduced inequality of public expenditures between rural and urban areas.

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