A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents

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\textsuperscript{1}Opinions and conclusions herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve System.
**Motivation**

The U.S. economy over the past 30+ years has been characterized by the following patterns:

1. Falling “long run” growth (after a burst of growth)

2. Falling labor share (due to composition)

3. Rising (national) concentration
Our story

Theory of endogenous growth with heterogeneous firms.

Source of the change since the 1990s: IT improvements extending the boundary of high-productivity firms.

High-productivity firms (with high markups) expand in response; aggregate labor share falls.

Expansion of high productivity firms deters innovation and undermines long-run growth (after initial burst of growth).
**Related Literature**

Declining growth and rising concentration:
Akcigit and Ates (2019), Liu, Mian and Sufi (2019)

Rising concentration:

Declining labor share:

**Our contribution:** a model generating all three patterns in response to increased span of control
Roadmap for today

Motivating facts

Theoretical framework

Quantification
Rise and Decline in TFP Growth

BLS MFP growth + R&D and IP contribution in labor augmenting form. % per year.
Updated version of Fernald (2015) figure 6A, % per year, 5-year moving average.
Falling labor share by IT intensity

1987 is normalized to 1 for each group
Declining Labor Share  
(mostly due to composition)

Cumulative change over specified period (ppt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982–2012</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>92–12</th>
<th>92–07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFG</td>
<td>RET</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>SRV</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>UTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \frac{\text{Payroll}}{\text{Sales}}$</td>
<td>-7.01</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>-1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between</td>
<td>-4.97</td>
<td>-4.03</td>
<td>-4.38</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
<td>-2.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Autor et al. (2017) Table 5.
# Rising National Concentration

Cumulative change over specified period (ppt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MFG</th>
<th>RET</th>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>SRV</th>
<th>92–12</th>
<th>92–07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>∆ Top 4 firms</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sales share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Top 20 firms</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sales share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Autor et al. 2017 Table 1. Sales-weighted across 4-digit industries.
Rising Establishments per Firm

Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics
Roadmap for today

Motivating facts

Theoretical framework

Quantification
Representative household maximizing

\[ U_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log C_t \]

subject to \( a_{t+1} = (1 + r_t)a_t + w_t L - C_t \) and a nPg-condition.

Resulting in the standard Euler equation

\[ \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} = \beta(1 + r_{t+1}) \]
Production side

Final output competitively produced with

\[ Y = \exp \left( \int_0^1 \log [q(i)y(i)] \, di \right), \]

where intermediates differ in quality \( q(i) \) and price \( p(i) \).

Resulting demand:

\[ y(i) = \frac{YP}{p(i)}, \]

where \( P \) is the price index.
**Firm heterogeneity**

There are $J$ firms.

Exogenous, permanent differences in the level of process efficiency across firms.

Endogenous, evolving differences in the level of product-specific quality across firms.
Process efficiency across firms:

- share $\phi$ with high productivity $\varphi^H$
- share $1 - \phi$ with low productivity $\varphi^L$

Production of product $i$ by firm $j$ is linear in labor

$$y(i, j) = \varphi(j) \cdot l(i, j)$$

Productivity differential $\Delta = \frac{\varphi^H}{\varphi^L} > 1$
Firm $j$ owns patent to produce $i \in [0, 1]$ at quality $q(i, j)$.

Spending $\psi_c \cdot Y$ units of final output on R&D increases the frontier quality of a randomly drawn line by factor $\gamma > 1$.

Firms choose R&D investment to maximize profits.

This leads to an endogenous rate of “creative destruction” $z_{t+1}$ and is the source of growth.
**Markup**

Markup is endogenously determined by the relative quality and process efficiency of the best and second-best firms.

The markup factor $\mu(i) = \frac{p(i, j(i), j'(i))}{w/\varphi(j(i))}$ is given by

$$
\mu(i, j(i), j'(i)) = \begin{cases} 
\gamma \Delta, & \text{if } j = H\text{-type}, j' = L\text{-type} \\
\gamma, & \text{if type of } j = \text{type of } j' \\
\gamma / \Delta, & \text{if } j = L\text{-type}, j' = H\text{-type}
\end{cases}
$$
**Boundary of the Firm**

Per-period overhead cost for firm $j$ with $n(j)$ products

$$\psi_o \cdot \frac{1}{2} n(j)^2 \cdot Y$$

Convexity yields a well-defined boundary of the firm.

High productivity firms operate more lines but not all lines.
(S*, z*, n_H*, n_L*) can be determined analytically from

\[
\psi_c = \frac{1 - S^*/\gamma - (1 - S^*)/(\gamma \Delta) - \psi_o n_H^*}{1/\beta - 1 + z^*}
\]

\[
\psi_c = \frac{1 - S^* \Delta/\gamma - (1 - S^*)/\gamma - \psi_o n_L^*}{1/\beta - 1 + z^*}
\]

\[\phi J n_H^* = S^*\]

\[(1 - \phi) J n_L^* = 1 - S^*\]
Steady state comparison: $\psi_o$ drops

Recall overhead cost is $\psi_o \frac{n^2}{2} Y$. Suppose $\psi_o$ drops permanently to a lower level.

How does the new steady state compare to the old one?

Particularly interested in effects on

- Concentration $S^*$
- Labor income share $1 - \alpha^*$ (within firm and overall)
- Growth rate $g^*$ and rate of creative destruction $z^*$
Steady state effect of lower $\psi_o$ on concentration

**Proposition**

$S^*$ rises monotonically as $\psi_o$ falls.

Intuition:
A larger size gap $n^*_H - n^*_L$ is needed to yield a given difference in their marginal overhead costs.
Labor income share

R&D and overhead cost both denominated in final output.

No physical capital.

Aggregate labor income share is the inverse of the average cost-weighted markup:

$$1 - \alpha_t = \frac{1}{\int_0^1 \mu_t(i) \frac{l_t(i)}{L} di} = \int_0^1 \frac{1}{\mu_t(i)} di.$$  

Thus, labor share depends on the distribution of markups, and in turn the joint distribution of leader and follower.
STeady state effect of lower $\psi_o$ on the labor income share

The labor income share within high and low productivity firms is monotonically increasing in $S^\star$.

Intuition: with a higher $S^\star$ a producer is more likely to face a high productivity competitor $\rightarrow$ lower markup.

However, the between effect goes in the opposite direction (increasing $S^\star$ tends to decrease the labor income share).

Overall effect: the aggregate labor share is decreasing in $S^\star$ (and therefore falls when $\psi_o$ falls) as long as $S^\star > 1/2$. 
Steady State Effect of Lower $\psi_o$ on the Growth Rate

Two opposing effects as $\psi_o$ falls:

Marginal value of innovating on an additional line determines the rate of creative destruction and growth.

Direct effect: lower $\psi_o$ $\rightarrow$ higher incentive to innovate.

GE effect: as $S^*$ increases $\rightarrow$ expected markup within a product line decreases.

For a range of parameter values the GE effect dominates and growth slows as $\psi_o$ falls.
Roadmap for today

Motivating facts

Theoretical framework

Quantification
Quantification

Overall strategy:

- Calibrate baseline parameter values to initial period
- Change $\psi_o$ to match the between change in labor share
- How big is the resulting change in the growth rate, concentration, and aggregate labor share?

Generalizations: CRRA preferences with IES of $1/\theta$; CES aggregation across products with elasticity $\sigma$
Baseline Calibration

Assigned: $\sigma = 4, \theta = 2$

Calibrated: $\psi_0^0 = 0.020, \phi = 0.032, \gamma = 1.47, \psi_c = 1.67, \beta = 0.978, \Delta = 1.34$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Parameter</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. top 10% concentration 1987–1992</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. productivity growth 1949–1995</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. aggregate markup</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. real interest rate</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. intangible share</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. labor share and size relation</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effect of decline in $\psi_o$**

$\psi_o$ falls 65.0% to match the between change in labor share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between change in labor share (%)</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Untargeted</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006–2017 productivity growth rate (ppt)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. change in aggregate labor share (%)</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. within change in labor share (%)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. change in concentration (ppt)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. change in intangible share (ppt)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Elsby et al (2013), Autor et al. (2017), BLS MFP.
# Initial vs. New Steady State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. creative destruction rate ($z^*$)</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. % of H-type products ($S^*$)</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. % of H-type sales ($\tilde{S}^*$)</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. markup of H-type firms</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. markup of L-type firms</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. aggregate markup</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. R&amp;D/PY</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. overhead/PY</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. rent/PY</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. real interest rate</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transition after $\psi_o \downarrow$
OUTPUT COMPONENTS AFTER $\psi_o \downarrow$
Labor share & markup after $\psi_o \downarrow$
Output and Consumption:

\( \psi_o \downarrow \) vs. No Decline
WELFARE

Utility from a consumption path:

\[ U(\{C_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln C_t \]

Consumption equivalence \( \lambda \)

\[ U(\{(1 + \lambda)C^{old}_t\}_t) = \frac{\ln(1 + \lambda)}{1 - \beta} + U(\{C^{old}_t\}_t) = U(\{C^{new}_t\}_t) \]

\( \lambda = -5.1\% \) i.e. \( \psi_o \) decline reduced welfare
We provide an endogenous growth theory built around firms with heterogeneous quality, productivity and markups.

As firm span of control increases, the theory predicts:

- Rising concentration
- A decline in the labor income share (driven by composition as opposed to a decline within firms)
- A fall in TFP growth after an initial burst

Theory allows us to analyze the consequences of alternative comparative statics through firm composition.
Appendix
Rise and decline in TFP growth

Source: BLS multifactor productivity series + R&D and IP contribution in labor augmenting form.
Falling entry and exit rate

Source: BDS
Falling Job Reallocation

Annual Rates of Job Reallocation Across Firms and Establishments, U.S. Nonfarm Private Sector

Source: Decker et al. (2014)
Non-rising investment rate

Source: BEA. Nominal investment over nominal GDP
“Big Business Is Too Big” David Leonhardt, New York Times, April 2 2018

The United States has an oligopoly problem—a concentration of corporate power that has been building for years but is only now starting to receive serious attention from policymakers, think tanks and journalists...This consolidation has helped hold down wages, raise prices and reduce job growth—while lifting corporate profits...The Democrats have put antitrust policy at the center of their economic agenda.
COST OF IT, INTANGIBLES

- Falling cost of IT
  - BEA IT deflator / GDP deflator

- Rising intangibles investment of large vs. small firms
  - Lashkari and Bauer (2018)
  - Crouzet and Eberly (2018)
Relative price of IT

Source: BEA (% change per year)
Concentration and Growth

- Small (young) firms appear more innovative
  - Akcigit and Kerr (2018)

- Small (young) firms grow faster
  - Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013)
FIRM MARKUP PERSISTENCE

- Revenue/Inputs
  - Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
  - David and Venkateswaran (2018)

- Labor shares
  - De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018)
  - Gouin-Bonenfant (2018)
Why not trade?

- labor’s share has fallen in U.S. non-manufacturing
  - Autor et al. (2017)

- labor’s share has fallen in many developing countries
  - Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)
Why not competition policy?

▶ labor’s share has fallen in many countries
  ▶ Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)

▶ local concentration has not risen
  ▶ Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Trachter (2018)
Within firm markups

Source: Baqae and Farhi (2018).
Dynamic firm problem

A firm with $n_t(j)$ highest quality patents and facing a share $s_t(j)$ of high-productivity competitors solves

$$V_t(n_t(j), s_t(j), S_t, \alpha_t, j) = \max_{x_t(j), n_{t+1}(j), s_{t+1}(j)} \{ \Pi_t(n_t(j), s_t(j), \alpha_t, j) - x_t(j)\psi_c Y_t P_t + \frac{1}{1 + r_t} V_{t+1}(n_{t+1}(j), s_{t+1}(j), S_{t+1}, \alpha_{t+1}, j) \}$$

s.t.

$$x_t(j) = n_{t+1}(j) - n_t(j)(1 - z_{t+1})$$

$$n_{t+1}(j) s_{t+1}(j) = s_t(j) n_t(j)(1 - z_{t+1}) + x_t(j) S_t$$

and

$$x_t(j) \geq 0$$