

Monetary policy and the revaluation of debt

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Motivation

- Dollar = unit of account for many nominal debt contracts
 - ▶ inflation \Rightarrow lower real value of dollar, nominal promises
 - ▶ wealth effects: good for borrowers, bad for lenders
- Two types of revaluation shock
 - ▶ surprise inflation: unanticipated increase in price level
 - ★ same % drop in real value for all promises, regardless of duration
 - ▶ surprising news about *future* inflation
 - ★ e.g. central bank announces higher inflation target
 - ★ smaller % drop in promises with short duration
 - ★ promises with short duration not affected by inflation in far future
- This talk
 - ▶ measurement of nominal position & exposure to revaluation shocks
update of Doepke & Schneider 2006 JPE
 - ▶ aggregate & welfare effects in a model with heterogeneous households
Doepke-Schneider-Selezneva 2018

Sectors, asset & net nominal positions

- Net Nominal Position (of a sector or individual household)

$NNP := \text{nominal assets} - \text{nominal liabilities.}$

- Sectors

- ▶ consider: households, government, rest of the world
- ▶ consolidate: business, including financial intermediaries.

- NNP contains

- ▶ nominal assets held indirectly through mutual funds, DC pension funds
- ▶ nominal debt owed indirectly through ownership of equity


- Data

- ▶ Flow of Funds Accounts → sectoral positions
- ▶ Survey of Consumer Finances → distribution of households


- Construct payment streams for all nominal instruments

- ▶ restate positions at market value
- ▶ measure duration by position: important for revaluation exercises


Net nominal positions by sector, % GDP




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
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
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
Household nominal positions: role of indirect debt




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
Gross household positions, % GDP



Revaluation shocks

- Inflation episode: 5% higher inflation for 10 years
- Two thought experiments
 - ▶ surprise inflation: one time unanticipated increase in price level
 - ★ same % drop in real value for all positions; upper bound
 - ▶ surprising news about *future* inflation
 - ★ smaller % drop in promises with short duration; lower bound
- Gains & losses on gross household positions
 - ▶ compute hypothetical gains & losses for each date
 - ▶ surprise inflation: gains < losses – households net lenders
 - ▶ surprising news: gains > losses recently – hh lend short, borrow long
- Net gains by group of households for SCF year 2013
 - ▶ consider only news: what if higher inflation target announced in 2013
 - ▶ rich = top 10% NW, poor = bottom 20% NW, middle class = rest
 - ▶ redistribution: old rich \Rightarrow young middle class


Losses on zero coupon bonds by maturity in %




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
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Redistribution among household groups, % GDP



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- *How do people respond? Study aggregate & welfare effects in model!*


Model overview

- Small open economy; no aggregate uncertainty
 - ▶ leisure, housing services, other consumption (numeraire)
- Housing
 - ▶ indivisible units differ by service flow; baseline: fixed distribution
 - ▶ competitive markets for service flow (rent), houses (house prices)
- Other assets
 - ▶ borrowing & lending at world interest rate
 - ▶ collateral constraint: borrowing \leq house value * (max LTV)
- Overlapping generations of households
 - ▶ differ in preferences: discount factor, housing tenure
 - ▶ differ in skills: permanent differences + idiosyncratic shocks
 - ▶ warm glow bequests
- Rest of economy
 - ▶ competitive CRS firms produce numeraire from capital & labor
 - ▶ government: income tax, spending, social security


Quantitative exercise

- Calibrate to aggregates & SCF data for 2013
 - ▶ match income & portfolios by age & net worth
- Revaluation shock: unanticipated increase in inflation target
 - ▶ 5% for 10 years: real wealth transfers by group of household
 - ▶ also gains for government & households, loss for rest of the world
 - ▶ redistribution occurs only in first period
- Compute transition path
 - ▶ impulse responses for individual actions, aggregates, welfare
 - ▶ fiscal policy: gradually adjust spending towards new steady state, income tax adjusts to satisfy budget constraint
- Aggregate effects if responses of winners & losers do not cancel
 - ▶ winners younger & have lower MPCs: consumption falls
 - ▶ losers retired, winners working: labor supply falls
 - ▶ persistent effects: propagation via wealth distribution


Redistribution among household groups, % GDP



Aggregate consumption & output (% steady state)



Welfare by group (% equiv. consumption for life)



Conclusion

- Monetary policy as a revaluation shock
 - ▶ large gains for government, losses for foreigners
 - ▶ large heterogenous welfare effects
 - ★ net borrowers win, especially middle-aged middle class
 - ★ net lenders lose, especially rich retirees
 - ▶ moderate but persistent changes in aggregates
 - ▶ role of housing if fixed factor
 - ★ savings responses move house prices, not capital stock
 - ★ price move at high end: middle class tries to upgrade
- Movements in real interest rates
 - ▶ matter in closed economy, especially with nominal rigidities
 - ▶ wealth effects + income & substitution effects (Auclert 2018 AER)
- Price stability & choice of unit of account
 - ▶ Doepke-Schneider 2017 Ecma: why a dominant unit of account?
 - ★ coordination minimizes mismatch of assets & liabilities in credit chains
 - ★ optimal unit comoves with assets of likely borrowers & is stable in value
 - ▶ recent literature in international finance on choice of dollar