Labor Markets and Monetary Policy

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Disclaimer

I am speaking for myself today, and not for others in the Federal Reserve or on the Federal Open Market Committee.

Basic Principle of Economic Policymaking

• Don't use a knife as a screwdriver.

• That is: Given a problem, use the appropriate policy tool for that problem.

What Problem Does Monetary Policy Solve?

• Economies have to adjust in response to macroeconomic shocks.

- like increases in oil prices or falls in asset prices

• Lesson from the 1970's: Monetary policy cannot eliminate this adjustment process.

• Primary role of monetary policy: offset impact of **nominal rigidities**.

What Are Nominal Rigidities?

• Broadly: Prices and inflation expectations adjust only sluggishly in response to shocks.

• This sluggish adjustment can create misallocations of resources.

• Appropriate monetary policy can mitigate these misallocations.

• Thus, if demand is low because of nominal rigidities, then monetary policy should be accommodative.

• (In this talk: monetary policy = interest rate policy, including recent LSAP.)

Monetary Policy and Unemployment

- When is monetary policy the right tool to lower high unemployment?
- Define u^* to be unemployment rate in the absence of nominal rigidities.

- u^* is called many things: structural, **natural**, potential, etc. ...

- Offsetting nominal rigidities implies that monetary policy accommodation should move with $u_t u_t^*$.
- Challenge for policymakers: u^* changes over time.

Two Questions about the Natural Rate

• What can we learn about u^* from the data on unemployment and vacancies?

• What other data can provide supplementary information about u^* ?

Question 1: Information in Unemployment and Vacancies

• Starting point: In large part, unemployment is high because job creation is low.

• Analyze sources of low job creation using Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.

• Main result: these data alone are not conclusive.

- Possible that low job creation is due only to real factors (for example, UI benefits).
 - That is, u^* may be nearly as high as u.

• Then: Current monetary policy is overly accommodative.

• But it is also possible that nominal rigidities are playing a significant role.

• That is, u^* may be much lower than u.

• Then: Current level of accommodation is appropriate.

Question 2: Other Sources of Information?

• Answer to question 1: Aggregate u-v data aren't sufficient to pin down u^* .

• Second question: Are there other data that can be of use?

• Yes: data in surveys and inflation.

• This auxiliary information supports current level of accommodation.

A Point of Clarification

• My question: What is u^* NOW?

• I'm not asking: What was u^* in December 2008?

• Many reasons to think that u^* changes over time.

• Policymakers need to know current (and future) u^* , not historical u^* .

Outline

1. Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) Model

2. Information in U-V Data

3. Other Sources of Information

4. Conclusions

1. DMP Model

• A firm pays a cost k to create a vacancy.

• With some probability, vacancy attracts a qualified applicant.

• Firm and applicant then bargain over the wage.

The Essential Model Element

• Key model variable is the ratio $\frac{u}{v}$.

• Firm is more likely to attract a qualified applicant if $\frac{u}{v}$ is high.

• Worker will accept lower wages if $\frac{u}{v}$ is high.

Benefits of Job Creation in the DMP Model

• Firm pays cost k to create a vacancy.

• Approximate formula for the firm's benefit from that vacancy:

$$rac{u}{v} imes (p-z) imes$$
 constant

Definition of Terms

• p is the worker's expected productivity (net of taxes!).

• z is the worker's flow benefits of not working.

Intuition for the Formula

$$rac{u}{v} imes$$
 ($p-z$) $imes$ constant

- Rises as $\frac{u}{v}$ rises because:
 - vacancies are likely to attract qualified applicants
 - applicants will accept low wages.

• Rises as p rises, because workers generate more output.

• Falls as z rises, because firm needs to pay higher wages.

Puzzling Lack of Job Creation?

• In December 2007, u = 0.05 and v = 0.031 (JOLTS data).

• In December 2010, u = 0.094 and v = 0.023.

• $\frac{u}{v}$ is 2.5 times higher in December 2010.

• Benefits of creating a job seem to have risen enormously.

• Costs have probably not changed.

• Why won't firms create jobs, given these large benefits?

• Answering this question will lead us to u^* .

2. Information in U-V Data

Aggregate Demand Shortfall

• Standard explanation is that demand is insufficient.

• Firms believe that they can't sell more than their current production ...

• and so they don't hire more workers.

• Implicit: Firms can't (or won't?) cut prices to generate more demand.

• "Insufficient demand" means prices aren't adjusting effectively.

• Nominal rigidities are generating low output and high unemployment.

• In this case, u^* is much lower than u.

Other Sources of Low Job Creation

• Does the DMP model suggest other explanations for low job creation?

• Return to the formula for benefits of job creation:

$$rac{u}{v} imes$$
 ($p-z$) $imes$ constant

• We've seen that $\frac{u}{v}$ rose by 2.5 times from 12/07 to 12/10.

• What about the other terms in the formula?

Changes in *p* (After-Tax Productivity)

• Why might p have fallen (relative to trend) since 2007?

- Expected increases in taxes:
 - federal and state; corporate, personal, sales

• Expected increases in input prices (like energy).

Changes in z (Benefits of Not Working)

• Why might z have risen (more than usual) since 2007?

- extensions in UI benefits

Tentative Numbers

• Mortensen-Nagypal (2007, RED) set p = 1 and z = 0.73.

- Suppose p fell by 10% and z rose by 0.05 in the past three years.
 - technically: relative to trend.

• These are very large – but not entirely implausible – changes.

• If p and z change like this, what happens to the benefits from job creation?

$$rac{u}{v} imes (p-z) imes$$
 constant

•
$$(\frac{u}{v}) \times (p-z)$$
 rises by only 11%.

• In this scenario: Nominal rigidities are much less significant.

• Hence: u^* is not much lower than u.

Summary

$$\frac{u}{v} imes (p-z) imes$$
 constant

• Since December 2007, $(\frac{u}{v})$ has gone up 2.5 times.

• By itself, this increase suggests that nominal rigidities are constraining job creation.

 $- u^*$ is well below u.

• BUT: It is *possible* that p has fallen and z has risen.

• $p \downarrow 0.1$ and $z \uparrow 0.05$ implies job creation benefits are only up 11%.

- But then nominal rigidities are not constraining job creation much.
 - u^* is nearly as high as u.

Bottom Line

• Aggregate u-v data are inconclusive about u^* .

• These data are inconclusive about appropriate level of monetary policy accommodation.

Labor Market Matching Efficiency

• Along with p and z, there is another factor that could increase u^* .

• If labor market matching efficiency fell, then u^* would rise.

• Definitionally: Labor market matching efficiency has declined if:

• Firm's probability of finding a qualified applicant is lower than is implied by the high value of $\frac{u}{v}$.

• DMP model (applied to *u-v* data) provides an estimate of the post-2007 fall in labor market matching efficiency.

• Even when we add this estimate, the u-v data are consistent with a wide range of possible u^* .

• u^* might be as low as 5.9% (if you think (p-z) hasn't changed).

• or u^* might be as high as 8.9% (if you think (p-z) has fallen by 0.15).

3. Other Information?

• Policymakers need to know u^* to determine appropriate monetary policy.

• The aggregate u-v data aren't definitive about the magnitude of u^* .

• Do policymakers have supplementary sources of information about u^* ?

Basic Intuition of Auxiliary Information

• u^* is low relative to u if nominal rigidities are keeping demand low.

• We need information to detect state of demand.

Surveys

• Various surveys of businesses about impediments to job creation.

• Reserve bank presidents ask businesspeople for causes of low job creation.

• What I find: "insufficient demand" first – and then taxes/regulation.

• Implication: u^* may have risen since December 2007, but $u^* < u$.

(Somewhat Crude) Inflation Heuristics

• If $u - u^*$ is high, then nominal rigidities are pushing demand down.

• That should be reflected in behavior of inflation.

• Basic idea: Low demand puts downward pressure on inflation.

• Exact impact depends on model of price-setting and expectations.

• Older models: $u_t - u_t^*$ is high when π_t (inflation) is low relative to π_{t-1} .

• Newer models: $u_t - u_t^*$ is high when π_t is low relative to π_{t+1}^e .

• In second half of 2010: core PCE inflation was 0.5%.

• Low compared with past core PCE inflation ...

• and low compared with future core PCE inflation.

• Both new and old models suggest $u_t - u_t^*$ is significantly positive.

4. Conclusions

• Is high unemployment mainly due to nominal rigidities?

• Or is it mainly due to other factors?

• Aggregate data on unemployment/vacancies aren't definitive.

• But other data imply that $u_t - u_t^*$ is significantly positive.

• My conclusion:

• It is appropriate for monetary policy to be highly accommodative.

Future Policy?

• In the future: I expect both u_t and u_t^* to fall over time.

• When will the FOMC need to cut back on accommodation?

- The FOMC will continue to re-evaluate as it gets new information.
- I will be paying close attention to the behavior of core inflation.