



Too Big to Fail:

Discussion of “Quantifying Subsidies for SIFIs”

Philip E. Strahan, Boston College & NBER

Minneapolis Fed

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# Distortions for TBTF borrowers

- Debt is too cheap for TBTF firms and not too insensitive to failure risk →
- Too much leverage
- Too much risk
  - Distortion propagates to non-financial firms
- Financial firms grow inefficiently large
  - To capture subsidy
- Small firms competitively disadvantaged



# What this paper shows

- Overall rating for banks (by Fitch) reflects:
  - Individual Rating (bank's own financial strength)
  - External Support Rating (embeds all forms of support)
  - What about Support Floor? (embeds govt. support)
- External support raises rating 2/3 notches
  - Hard to see how it could come out any other way (Why would Fitch ignore its own external support assessment?)
- Paper translates the rating advantage to a yield-spread advantage based on Soussa (2000)
  - Soussa also does not look at yields (infers yield from historical default+model).





# What this paper does not show

- How important is the Fitch external support rating for yields?
  - Yields may respond more to external support if such support lowers systematic risk of bonds
  - Yields may respond less to external support if markets do not believe them
- So, not clear how much (or even whether) external supports affects magnitude of safety net subsidies

# Regressions I would have liked to see in this paper

- $$\text{Spread}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta^1 \text{Individual-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^2 \text{External Support-Rating}_{i,t} + \text{Control Variables}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
  - What component of the rating matters most to the market?
  - Also consider *Support Floor*, to focus on govt. bailouts.
- $$\text{Spread}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta^1 \text{Individual-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^2 \text{External Support-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^3 * \text{Post-Crisis}_t * \text{Individual-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^4 \text{Post-Crisis}_t * \text{External Support-Rating}_{i,t} + \text{Control Variables}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
  - Has the market *changed* its assessment of the value of safety nets post crisis?



# Regressions I would have liked to see in this paper (cont.)


- $\text{Spread}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta^1 \text{Individual-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^2 \text{External Support-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^3 * \text{Size}_{i,t} * \text{Individual-Rating}_{i,t} + \beta^4 \text{Size}_{i,t} * \text{External Support-Rating}_{i,t} + \text{Control Variables}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$ 
  - Does Individual-Rating matter more for smaller banks?
  - Does External-Support matter more for TBTF banks?



# Is TBTF Getting Worse?


- Greater importance of finance to the economy
  - Credibility problem has its roots in concern about spillovers
- Greater concentration in the financial and banking system
  - Morgan+Bear+WaMu
  - Bank of America+Countrywide+Merrill Lynch
  - Wells Fargo+Wachovia

# Finance value-added increasing: Finance / GDP (%)






# Concentration increasing: Top-10 Bank Share



# But post-crisis adjustments have made system more robust


- More Capital
- More Liquidity
- More Stable Funding
- Less Off-Balance Sheet Leverage

# Capital ratios have increased at large banks






# Large banks hold more cash



# More stable funding: Deposit/assets at large banks




# Have expectations of bailouts have declined?


- CDS Markets now price large-bank risk
- Natural experiment: Removal of TAG at the end of 2012
  - Money flowed into small banks (not large ones)




# CDS Spreads for Top 10 Banks, 2004 to 2006



# CDS Spread pre- v. post-crisis, Top 10 banks



# Changes in Transactions Deposits with the Expiration of TAG (Kroszner, 2013)







# Conclusion

- This paper:
  - Fitch embeds external support into its rating
  - Need to understand how different dimensions of rating affect yields
    - Own v. External Support
    - Support from Parent v. govt.
    - Time variation (pre v. post crisis)
    - Variation across banks types (large v. small)
- TBTF going forward:
  - Financial system is stronger
  - Expectations of bailouts seem diminished
    - New tools to deal with distress
    - Political pressure not to bailout (Tea Party)
    - Fiscal pressures (too big to save?)



**THANK YOU!**