of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 17, 1998.
of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Subcommittee
on Finance and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Commerce, U.S.
House of Representatives, April 28, 1999.
For a plan to fully eliminate protection of uninsured
Bankers Roundtable (1997), Deposit Insurance Reform in the
Public Interest (Washington D.C.: Bankers Roundtable)
For a discussion of making credible commitments through
explicit contracts with policymakers:
Carl E. Walsh, "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American
Economic Review 85 (March 1995). pp. 150-167.
For a discussion of plans that try to reduce the incentives
to provide bailouts:
Thomas Hoenig, "Rethinking
Financial Regulation," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Economic Review, 81 (2)(1996), pp.5-13.
Mark Flannery,"Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation
Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform," Journal
of Financial Services Research, 16 (2/3), pp. 101-117.
Frederic Mishkin, "Moral Hazard and Reform of the Government
Safety Net," paper presented at "Lessons from the Recent Global
Financial Crises," sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
Oct. 1, 1999.
Ron Feldman and Arthur Rolnick, "Fixing
FDICIA: A Plan to Address the Too-Big-Too-Fail Problem," Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report, March
Federal Reserve System Study Group on Subordinated Notes and
Debentures, "Using Subordinated Debt as an Instrument of Market
Discipline," Staff Study 172, December 1999.
For a discussion of appointing "conservative" policymakers:
Kenneth Bogoff, "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate
Monetary Target," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
100 (November 1985) pp. 1169-1190.
Return to: Thoughts on Designing Credible Policies After Financial Modernization