Author
For over 50 years of research and writing at the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York, Anna Schwartz has been an important force in shaping the course of economic research. Her seminal work, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, co-authored with Milton Friedman, revolutionized the study of money, and her many other books, papers and reviews have also been influential.
Schwartz's knowledge of economic history and her ability to deftly handle large amounts of data have made her a legend among her many collaborators over the years.
Currently a member of the board of editors of three economic journals, she also has a passion for Trollope's novels . . . and she's left her mark on Minneapolis' restaurant scene.
Editor's Note: In this interview with The Region, Anna Schwartz, the eminent monetary economist, cast doubts about the viability of a unified European currency. In December 2001, three years after the introduction of the euro, and on the verge of the new currency's disbursement into the economy, we asked Schwartz to revisit her views. Read her comments: Assessing the Euro Three Years After Its Launch.
Region: When A Monetary History of the United States was published in 1963 it drew immediate critical acclaim from economists in all schools of thought. Thirty years later, the book is cited as much—or more—in scholarly journals as it was at the time of its publication, a rare feat in economic research. What inspired the book and what did you hope to accomplish through the work?
Schwartz: The critical acclaim was less general than the initial statement suggests. Taking seriously changes in the quantity of money was not a mainstream position. Our emphasis on the quantity of money, not interest rates, as the variable to measure monetary policy was unusual. Our finding that monetary policy played a central role in U.S. cyclical developments was met with disbelief by man economists. Some of them initially dismissed the notion of a link between monetary change and output but are now its fervent supporters.
What inspired the book was the National Bureau's program to study the cyclical behavior of different economic processes—transportation, inventories, consumption and so on. We had constructed estimates of the U.S. money stock from 1867 to 1960; annual estimates before 1875, semiannual until 1881, annual again through 1906 and monthly from May 1907 on. It was our assignment at the National Bureau to study the cyclical behavior of the money estimates.
Our plan was to begin with a narrative describing fluctuations in the growth rate of the money stock, organized in accordance with the NBER dates at which business activity reached a cyclical peak or trough. We wanted to examine the factors that accounted for the fluctuations in money growth and how the changes in money affected the course of events.
We initially proposed to prepare another study dealing with trends and cycles in the stock of money. We published the study of trends, which appeared 19 years after A Monetary History, relating the trends not only in the U.S. but also in the U.K. money estimates to income, prices and interest rates. In between those two dates, we published Monetary Statistics, describing in detail how the U.S. money estimates were constructed.
We did not get around to the study of monetary cycles, except for the paper on money and business cycles that we contributed to the NBER conference in 1962 on The State of Monetary Economics. The conference proceedings were published in 1963, a few months before A Monetary History. So we left off in 1982 without having finished all parts of our original research program.
Region: Will it be completed?
Schwartz: No. Friedman and I are no longer engaged in any kind of massive project. We do things together as people ask us to contribute a paper, which we did in 1986 to the JME [Journal Of Monetary Economics] on "Does Government Have Any Role in Money?"
There are going to be three more reviews of A Monetary History 30 years after publication in the Journal Of Monetary Economics, by Bob Lucas, Jeffrey Miron and Bruce Smith, who has been at the Minneapolis Fed. So, we will have three different commentaries on what we did in the past, but I doubt that we will respond. We didn't respond when the first reviews appeared; why respond 30 years later? It will just be interesting to see how views have altered over the years, in these decades, and to get fresh responses by these three reviewers. Occasionally we have done some things, as I have said, because people have asked us to write something together but we have no big projects under way. Those years are behind us.
Region: As a treatise in economic history as well as economics, the book spawned "a revolution in monetary history," according to the economist Michael Bordo. Have these new treatments of monetary history caused you to rethink any of the book's suppositions?
Schwartz: New treatments of monetary history have usually challenged our interpretations of particular events, such as the failure of the Bank of the United States in December 1930, why national banks didn't fully exploit profit opportunities that issue of national bank notes afforded, whether it is news or fundamentals that explained the behavior of variables like the exchange rate. These challenges don't really cause me to rethink the book's suppositions.
The Romers have challenged the monetary shocks we identified in A Monetary History as actions of the monetary authority that were independent of contemporary changes in output and that were followed by cyclical declines. They allege possible bias in our selection, and in their view only two qualify as a monetary disturbance—the discount rate hikes in 1920 and 1931. However, they conclude that bias does not account for the contractionary effect of the monetary shocks.
We ourselves have modified two interpretations we offered in A Monetary History. One was a reference to the permanent income elasticity of demand for money as much higher than unity, that money was a luxury good, the percentage change in demand for which increased by more than the percentage change in income. Comparison with velocity in the U.K. convinced us that we had overestimated the income elasticity for the decades before 1903 because we did not allow for the effect of the changing financial structure of the U.S. economy. We replaced the early monetary totals for the U.S. in the trends volume by adjusted totals that allow for a 2.5 percent increase in the quantity of money demanded arising from changing financial sophistication in this country. Still in all, the income elasticity of the demand for money is somewhat above unity for the U.S., somewhat below unity for the U.K.
The other interpretation in A Monetary History that we have since modified relates to deposit insurance, which we celebrated in the book as the greatest success of the New Deal. We attributed the absence of bank failures to deposit insurance. Yet, there were no bank failures in other industrialized countries that had never adopted deposit insurance. Bank failures emerged in the mid-1970s both here and abroad. The explanation seems to be that a relatively stable world price level until the mid-1960s contributed to sound banking. Sound credit analysis depends on the assumption of price stability. Unexpected price change can invalidate the assumptions underlying bank lending and investing. We associated sound banking with deposit insurance, when the explanation we now believe was price level stability.
Region: If you were to write a new edition today, what would you change, if anything?
Schwartz: The book has been reprinted at least seven times. I wouldn't change anything. The book was right in the context of the time that it was written. You couldn't write that book now the way we did then. It's a different world. So, why rewrite something that was perfectly good for its time, seems to have been perfectly good for 30 years. Minor changes—not that we're ready to reverse the explanations that we give that have been challenged. I'm not convinced that the people who have used A Monetary History as a source for papers have had a better understanding of the events, the developments that we described in the way that we did.
Region: Your collaborator on A Monetary History, Milton Friedman, speaking of your many joint efforts, once remarked: "It was an almost perfect example of collaboration. Anna did all the work and I got a lot of the credit. How did you and Friedman come to work together on A Monetary History?
Schwartz: Well, first of all, Friedman was being gallant. That explains that remark. And, he has also said that he could not have written A Monetary History without me and I could not have written it without him. I think that that is a fair statement about the collaboration.
We got together because Arthur Burns, who was then the director of research at the NBER, thought that Friedman and I would make a good team to undertake cyclical analysis of monetary change. That was the bureau's program of research in those years: to examine, as I have already said, the way different parts of the economy were affected by cyclical change and what effect these parts had on cyclical change. So, all those books up there [on the shelves] were the product of that research program. Out study just fit into this ongoing research effort.
Region: What was the manner of your collaboration with Friedman on your many projects? For example, what was the division of labor? Did you write together? Did you ever disagree?
Schwartz: Collaboration usually involved exchanging material by mail. The statistical work was done in New York. We had research assistants. Occasionally, Friedman would come to New York, but usually we did not meet while the work was under way.
We exchanged manuscripts suggesting revisions to each other. Chapters went back and forth. Statistical tables went back and forth. Of course there were disagreements, but neither one took offense. The disagreements were clearly resolved. But, this is usually the way that collaboration operates. There's no magic formula. People just have to have personalities that are congenial and both be serious about what they are doing. So, that was never a problem.
Region: You have written extensively about Great Britain over the years. When did you develop an interest in Great Britain and what, if any, lessons does that country's economic history hold for the United States?
Schwartz: I was a graduate student at Columbia in 1936 when Arthur D. Gayer, who was then teaching economics at Barnard College and whose student I had been as an undergraduate, invited me to participate in a study of British business cycles from 1790 to 1850. Gayer had written a dissertation at Oxford on industrial fluctuations and unemployment in Britain from 1815 to 1850. Wesley Mitchell, who was the founder of the National Bureau of Economic Research, gave Gayer encouragement to pursue the British study. Not surprisingly, we adopted the NBER technique of cyclical analysis of time series. Walt Rostow joined the team after the study was under way. He had a major influence on the design of the interpretation—essentially Keynesian, emphasizing a real business cycle view, with expansions generated by growth in foreign trade and investment. He also introduced consideration of the long-run trend in output.
The study was completed in 1941 but wasn't published until 1953 in two volumes as The Growth And Fluctuation Of The British Economy 1790-1850. By that date, Gayer had died. In 1975, the two volumes were reprinted and Rostow and I wrote a new preface. I then stated my reservations concerning the analytical approach of the study. The study reflected the outlook of the economics profession at the time it was written.
In the preface, I withdrew support for the views in the volumes that (1) the monetary system played a passive role in the U.K.; (2) the emphasis on the familiar short-run liquidity effect on changes in interest rates of monetary change to the exclusion of an income effect and of a price expectations effect; (3) the emphasis on changes in relative prices and a cost-push explanation that stresses demand and supply conditions in individual markets and ignores secular price episodes from 1790 to 1850 that occurred at approximately the same dates in numerous countries.
With respect to the lessons the U.K.'s economic history holds for the U.S., the importance of the difference in institutional structures of the two countries is clearly dominant. The Great Depression was far more catastrophic in the U.S. than in the U.K. One reason is the ineptness of the Federal Reserve compared to the Bank of England's performance. Banking panics in the U.S. occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries, whereas the last one to occur in the U.K. was in 1866. The banking system in the U.K. has been much more stable than in the U.S. I'll leave the comparison to that dimension—the difference in institutional structures. There were other differences.
Region: Suppose today in central banking such errors occurred, as you described, by one major central bank. Could they act as independently as they did back then?
Schwartz: Well, before 1914, the major central bank was the Bank of England. Some people believe that the reason that the gold standard was successful was the role that the Bank of England played. Not everybody takes that point of view, but it's not clear that central banks were independent of each other during that period. They helped each other out. A signal from the Bank of England in raising its bank rate was enough to let all the other central banks know "things are going to change, boys, let's all play this synchronously."
Region: Does history have any lessons for the planners of a European monetary union?
Schwartz: The planners of a European monetary union would be well advised to study the reasons the pre-World War I gold standard was a successful monetary regime, why the Genoa Economic Conference of 1922 and the London Economic Conference of 1933 failed, why the interwar gold standards collapsed, why Bretton Woods did not survive inflation in the center country, and why the exchange rate mechanism has been on the ropes since 1992. The lessons of the past are that a monetary regime succeeds when countries with similar goals face similar shocks. Member countries have to be willing to yield national sovereignty to a supernational monetary authority. In an uncertain world subject to unforeseen and unanticipated shocks, countries have national priorities that do not preclude the use of domestic monetary policy and are reluctant to commit themselves to a common goal like price stability. The history of international monetary regimes suggests that European monetary union is a nonstarter.
Region: Will it ever happen?
Schwartz: Well, at the moment, I think that the chances are very slim. I really don't see that. Essentially this was a proposal that politicians formulated. They didn't really consult the economic policymakers in their countries. This was a great idea that emerged from Jacques Delors' head and from the people he was working with in Brussels. Nothing that has happened in this past year suggests that the great plans for the implementation of a monetary union are likely to be achieved. I just don't see them meeting the basic conditions for its success. I think if you saw political union happening, then you might see monetary union. But, with national sentiments still pretty strong in each of the member countries, I wonder that there can really be a belief that this is going to work.
Region: From 1981 to 1982 you were staff director of the U.S. Gold Commission. What was the mission of that group, and what were its major conclusions?
Schwartz: The U.S. Gold Commission was established in accordance with a provision in an Oct. 7, 1980, act of Congress. The main reason for the legislation was to authorize an increase in the U.S. quota in IMF [International Monetary Fund]. However, to obtain Sen. Jesse Helms' acquiescence to consideration by the Senate of the IMF quota enlargement, the leadership accepted an amendment Helms introduced in the Senate. Congressman Ron Paul introduced a similar amendment in the House. The provision directed the secretary of the Treasury to establish and chair a commission of 15 members to conduct a study and make recommendations with regard to the policy of the U.S. concerning the role of gold in the domestic and international monetary systems.
The sponsors of the Gold Commission probably were counting on the White House to signal its interest in a strong pro-gold recommendation by the commission. Such a signal would have influenced the designation of members, in which case the members subject to White House influence would have formed a majority. No signal came. The pro-gold members of the commission were a minority. The three Federal Reserve members were concerned to limit discussion of inflation and monetary policy as not a proper concern of the commission. Only Congressman Paul and two public members were pro-gold, but with different agendas.
Probably the sponsors were content to use the commission as a forum to promote whatever use of gold they could prevail on the commission to accept while focusing public attention on the importance they attached to a role for gold in the monetary system.
The main substantive proposal was the recommendation that the Treasury issue gold bullion coins of specified weights, without dollar denomination or legal tender status, to be manufactured from its existing stock of gold and to be sold at a small markup over the market value of the gold content, the gold coins to be exempt from capital gains taxes and from sales taxes. For the pro-gold forces, introducing gold coins into circulation was a first step toward achieving their ultimate objective of linking the monetary system to gold.
One other substantive recommendation of the commission was that the Congress and the Federal Reserve study the merits of establishing a rule specifying that the growth of the nation's money supply be maintained at a steady rate which insures long-range price stability. The recommendation was opposed by the three Federal Reserve members of the commission and the two members of the Joint Economic Committee. The gold supporters voted for it.
Region: Is there any need for the central banks of the world to continue to hold gold?
Schwartz: There is no need for the central banks of the world to continue to hold gold. Still, they are reluctant to sell it off. Some of them want to retain gold for precautionary use; some want to use it as collateral for borrowings from other central banks; some view it as a war chest. Belgium and Netherlands sold off all their gold in the fall of 1992. I don't know what their motives were, but as a whole I think central banks are not ready to let go of the gold. Some of them have quite sizable stocks.
Certainly, the U.S. isn't ready to sell it off. The Federal Reserve members on the Gold Commission, that's 11 years ago, didn't want the Fed to sell it. So, I know of no advocacy right now in this country for the sale of the gold, although it has been proposed in the past as a way of reducing the deficit. We auctioned gold in the late 1970s as a way of reducing the deficit, but there doesn't seem to be any interest in that currently.
Region: To what do you attribute the recent increase in the price of gold?
Schwartz: The recent increase in the price of gold, as in the past, may reflect inflation fears. While some countries are selling gold, they may be selling it into a rising market. China has become an important buyer, and inflation has certainly picked up there. I know one attitude is that it is just a speculative flurry now and it will subside as it has in the past. Usually a rise in the price of gold has been a harbinger of inflation. Whether that is in the cards now, we'll have to wait and see.
Region: Is gold an accurate indicator over time?
Schwartz: Well since the market price of gold was detached from the monetary price of gold, I think on the whole it has been an accurate forecaster. Certainly the rise in the late 1970s and the peak in 1980 coincided with a real burst of inflation. People have this belief in gold. I think as long as you have that kind of attachment to it, it will reflect the sentiment of the people who hold it.
Region: The Federal Reserve System was created, in large part, in response to recurring banking panics. Barring the occurrence of banking panics in U.S. history, would the Fed have been created anyway; that is, was a central bank an inevitability for a major Western economy like the United States?
Schwartz: I believe the Fed would have been established even had there not been a perceived need for a lender of last resort. Reading the National Monetary Commission studies of European central banks—a big collection of studies done before the Federal Reserve System was established—suggests that the subliminal message was that the United States could not play a significant role in the world if it did not create a central bank to match that institution in the financial system of other countries.
So, there is a kind of image of what the central bank is that has accounted for the spread of central banking. For example, after World War I many countries that did not have central banks earlier all adopted them because the idea was that you couldn't really be an up-to-date, Westernized, industrialized country unless you had such an institution.
Region: Back to Europe, how will central banking evolve if Western Europe continues to move toward some form of economic unification?
Schwartz: Apparently, economic unification plans do not include the dismantling of national central banks. They will continue to operate in a federal system of central banks. A governing council of the 12 governors plus a six-member executive board will meet regularly to determine policies the national central banks will carry out. It is difficult for me to believe that such a scheme will result in harmonious and efficient monetary policy.
Region: What role if any do you see for central banking in the countries of Eastern Europe?
Schwartz: If Eastern European economies are ever to become well-functioning market economies, one essential will be a commitment on the part of their central banks to provide sound currencies. The record of the socialists' central banks suggests that a big problem for their successors will be establishing credibility for their commitment to limit monetary growth. One way they will try to gain credibility is to adopt fixed exchange rates with Western currencies. Whether they will succeed is contingent on all the other reforms that those economies must put in place.
Region: It's going to take time, in other words.
Schwartz: It sure is. I think the initial reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall was that this world is going to be transformed in 1-2-3. We are going to have all this capital that is going to flow to these former socialist countries and we are going to remake them into vibrant economies. If Western Germany is having the kinds of problems that it has with Eastern Germany, the lesson is that it's going to take a long time. The final outcome isn't by any means assured.
I think the euphoria that greeted that event might have been well grounded in the sense that you have liberated people from the kinds of oppression that they suffered. But in the sense of creating new institutions, establishing law there that will guarantee rights, I think that you have to be much more pessimistic about how these things will come about, and whether people will have the patience to wait for all these changes to be in place before they can really aspire to an improvement in their lives.
Region: In A Monetary History, you and Friedman write that the Fed was largely responsible for the banking panic of the early 1930s. What errors did the Fed commit and why was it incapable of recognizing those errors?
Schwartz: One of the reasons the Fed may have failed to respond to the banking panics of 1930-33 was that there had been many bank failures during the 1920s that had not proved contagious. Hundreds of banks failed every one of those years in the 1920s. The Fed may have regarded the surge of bank failures at the end of 1930 as simply a continuation of the experience of the 1920s.
In addition, the System's attitude was that bank failures were a problem of bank management, which was not its responsibility. Mainly, however the System missed the connection between bank failures, runs on banks, contraction of deposits and weakness of the bond market. When banks were trying to satisfy depositors' demand for cash they would sell off their bonds. So, the bond market just collapsed because of all of these sales. The Fed just didn't see the connections between what the banks were doing to save themselves that ultimately resulted in more bank failures than had initially precipitated the panic. Bank failures, in the Fed's view, were a consequence of bad management but hardly a cause of financial and economic collapse. That was their error.
Also, many of the banks that failed were non-members, and the Fed had no feeling of responsibility for them. I mean, the Fed's concern was member banks. Yet, when the Bank of the United States failed, the biggest member bank to have failed up to this point, it didn't do anything. It tried—that's a story we tell in the monetary history—but it could have nipped that panic in the bud.
Region: So, the Fed didn't understand its new role or how important it really was?
Schwartz: It had a very parochial view of what its mission was. The economy was dying at its feet and the Fed had no clear vision of what it should do.
Region: Why was that?
Schwartz: Well, and it seems an incredible kind of worry, they were worried about reigniting inflation. I mean here prices are dropping, wages are dropping, and yet the thought of doing anything expansionary .... well, the stock market will start to boom, we'll have price inflation. And yet, how could they have had such thoughts in the midst of all of this catastrophe? That was for sure the way they reasoned.
The only Fed district bank that we think had some glimmer about what they should be doing was the New York Fed. We attribute the failure of the New York Fed's views to prevail to the death of Benjamin Strong, who was then the governor of the Bank and had died in 1928 at a most inopportune time. That's another story.
Region: Has the Fed, as an institution, learned from its past mistakes; that is, does the Fed have an institutional memory?
Schwartz: The Fed as an institution would not repeat the errors of 1930-33. I think the real problem, currently, is the opposite. It's a propensity to magnify the dire consequences of bank failure so that bailouts become defensible.
Region: They have oversteered in the other direction?
Schwartz: Yes.
Region: To the detriment of the economy, though? To the detriment of the industry?
Schwartz: To the detriment of the integrity of the financial system. If every bank failure is viewed as a potential disaster for the economy, you're not going to be able to hold the private sector to a standard of reasonable economic performance if you're always going to be bailing out people because they've made mistakes. In my view, a big bank failure isn't going to undermine the economic system. That's a different story.
Region: Do we have too much deposit insurance?
Schwartz: Well, deposit insurance is surely a system in need of reform. But, again, it is so mixed up with the political situation that any kind of effort to make it a more reasonable kind of insurance is going to be defeated by politicians. They will never be able to convince their constituents that what they are doing isn't robbing the constituents of something instead of making the system as a whole more viable. That's a very serious problem.
Region: As an original member of the Shadow Open Market Committee, a group of economists that monitors Fed monetary policy, you have watched the Fed closely for 20 years. How would you rate the Fed's efforts at stabilizing prices over those years?
Schwartz: Since the traumatic experience of inflation in the 1970s, the Fed has certainly become more sensitive to its responsibility to bring inflation close to the zone of price stability. This has clearly been a goal in recent years.
Region: How should monetary aggregates be used in formulating monetary policy? Is M2 a reliable aggregate?
Schwartz: What is deplorable about current monetary policy is that the Fed has been basing its actions on changes in the real economy, particularly the unemployment rate. The Fed should operate with a nominal target, the only kind of target it can control. The reliability of the M2 target year in and year out is demonstrable. I'm not talking about quarter-to-quarter change, which is the only timing that the Fed seems to be able to focus on. It's a mistake. I mean, what the Fed should be looking at is some long-term stability. M2 is the target that will give it that kind of assurance, and if it hits the target, the rest of the economy will perform the way it should. The incongruity of the Fed's specifying a target range for M2, failing to achieve it, and then ignoring its failure quarter after quarter is a demerit for the System. M2 is a better predictor of nominal GDP two quarters ahead than any other basis for formulating monetary policy.
I don't know how the Fed interprets what is happening to the growth rate of nominal GDP in 1993, and the very weak recovery since 1991. M2 growth has been either negative or faltering all along. That is something that I think is a very damaging record.
Region: On a personal note we understand that you enjoy reading outside the field of economics. What type of books do you read, and who are your favorite authors?
Schwartz: I'm a reader of Trollope's novels and his short stories. The short stories aren't nearly as good as the novels—Trollopemania.
Region: Are you a member of the Trollope Society?
Schwartz: Yes of course. I also enjoy biographies of composers. Currently, I'm reading the biography of Benjamin Britten, which is not the greatest but since someone gave it to me as a gift I'm reading it. I certainly think Benjamin Britten is a great composer. The truth of the matter is I don't have enough time for all these lovely things that I would like to do. On a plane . . . that's the time to get your reading in. By the time I get home from the office, fix dinner and take a look at The New York Times, I'm ready to go to bed. I get up very early in the morning so I don't have much time.
Region: In addition to your literary interests, you've been described as a lover of opera and someone who fully enjoys New York's cultural amenities. You've been called a "true New York intellectual." How do you plead?
Schwartz: I don't think of myself as a "true New York intellectual." New York intellectuals don't share my views at all. I mean, this is a sea of liberal left-wing Democrats. I don't belong in that crowd. I do enjoy the opportunities available in the city to hear opera and chamber music, to visit museums, to see theater and ballet, but I'm just not what people think of as a New York intellectual.
Region: As a final question, I understand you have a connection with Minneapolis . . .
Schwartz: Yes I have a nephew and a niece who live there. My nephew teaches at the university, the niece has been running a restaurant in Minneapolis in recent years.
About two years ago I was at the Minneapolis Fed for a monetary conference. My niece picked me up at the Minneapolis Fed after the dinner that concluded the conference. She drove me around Minneapolis, and then we ended up at the restaurant. I got out of the car, opened the door of the restaurant, and there's the whole crowd from the Minneapolis Fed at the bar in the restaurant. I was just floored by seeing them, and of course they were floored to see me come in. I was told afterwards that this restaurant, which is known as Nikki's—my niece's name—is now known as Anna's Pub.
Region: Thank you, Ms. Schwartz.
Recent Publications"Milton, Money, and Mischief: Symposium and Articles in Honor of Milton Friedman's 80th. Birthday" (with J.L. Jordan, A.H. Meltzer and T.J. Sargent), Economic Inquiry 31 (April 1993) "Do Currency Boards have a Future?" Wincott Lecture, Institute of Economic Affairs. Occasional Paper 88, (November 1992) "The Misuse of the Fed's Discount Window," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 1992 "Money Versus Credit Rationing: Evidence for the National Banking Era, 1880-1914" (with M. Bordo and P. Rappoport), in C. Goldin and H. Rockoff (eds.), Strategic Factors in 19th Century American Economic History: In Honor of Robert W. Fogel, University of Chicago Press, 1992 More about Anna SchwartzResearch Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York Adjunct Professor of Economics, Graduate School of the City University of New York Board of Editors: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking; Journal of Monetary Economics; Journal of Financial Services Research Will be named Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association, in January 1994 Honorary Visiting Professor, City University Business School, London, 1984-1996 Staff Director, Gold Commission, 1981-1982 Doctorate, Columbia University; Doctorate Honoris Causa, University of Florida, Stonehill College and Iona College Curriculum vitae via NBER |
