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An Equilibrium Model of Quits under Optimal Contracting

Working Paper 266 | Published September 1, 1984

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An Equilibrium Model of Quits under Optimal Contracting

Abstract

In this article we use the techniques developed in examining optimal contracting with imperfect information to build a simple equilibrium model of a labor market with imperfect information. We then use the model to examine the effects that imperfect information imposes on labor markets, particularly when compared with full information and noncontractual base lines. We demonstrate that quits increase in periods of high output, without postulating exogenous price rigidity.


Published in _European Economic Review_ (vol. 37, iss. 6, August 1993, pp. 1203-1222), https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(93)90131-S.