Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial Intermediation

Abstract

In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.576

Published in: _Journal of Economic Theory_ (Vol. 109, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 1-23), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00017-0.

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Abstract

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